Published on the 15th of the month.

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PACIFIC LIBRARY

Vol. XIII., No. 1. APRIL, 1923

# THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

A monthly Magazine to maintain the cause of
**TRUTH, FREEDOM, and COMPREHENSIVENESS**
in the Anglican Communion.

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, B.D.

## CONTENTS


| | PAGE |
|---|---|
| Signs of the Times:— | |
| No Dogmas No Deans | 1 |
| The Faith in Action—Dr. Glover and Dr. Fosdick | 3 |
| The Catholic Church 'in parvo' | 6 |
| Pulpit Politics | 7 |
| The Outlook — The Editor. | 10 |
| The Roman Catholic Church and Reunion — M. D. Petre. | 14 |
| What is the Church? — Hastings Rashdall, D.D., D.Litt., D.C.L., F.B.A. | 21 |
| Some Inherent Difficulties of Religious Liberalism — Canon Tollinton, D.D. | 30 |
| Christianity and Science — Cyril Norwood, Litt.D. | 40 |
| Book Reviews:— | |
| Orthodox Dualism. Lily Dougall | 45 |
| The Foundations of Personal Religion | 53 |
| Correspondence:— | |
| The Life of Bishop Hicks | 54 |
| Psychology, Ancient and Modern | 55 |
| Christian Science | 56 |


**OXFORD: BASIL BLACKWELL, 49 BROAD STREET**

*AGENTS:* SOUTH AFRICA—T. MASKEW MILLER, Cape Town.
AUSTRALIA—A. McCUBBIN & Co., 152 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne.
NEW ZEALAND—WALTER NASH, 110–112 Lambton Quay, Wellington.

Price 1/- net. Annual Subscription, 10/6.

V.13
1923/
24

**QUALITY** **SERVICE**

**IF YOU REQUIRE**

The finest Wines, Spirits Cigars and Tobacco,
The best quality Provisions, Groceries & Confectionery
Combined with prompt and courteous attention,
Then you will save money, trouble and time
by ordering from

**GRIMBLY HUGHES & CO. LTD.** THE CORNMARKET STORES, OXFORD.

Telephone "Oxford Four."

# THE MITRE HOTEL, OXFORD.

THIS well-known Hotel for Families and Gentlemen, which is situate in the centre of the finest street in Europe, close to the Colleges, and within an easy distance of the river, has been enlarged and much improved. While the traditional antiquity of the building has been carefully preserved, visitors will find in it all the refined comforts of a MODERN HOTEL. The MITRE is largely patronized by distinguished English, American, and Continental Visitors and is recognised as one of the best first-class Hotels in the United Kingdom.

**Dining, Drawing, Reading and Smoking Rooms, Lounge, Good Suites of Rooms, and Four Spacious Billiard Rooms.**
**Electric Light. A Night Porter in attendance.**

Tariff on application to C. J. VERT, Manager. Telephone 335. Telegrams: 'Mitre,' Oxford.

# HOOKHAM & COMPANY,

*Clerical Outfits for Home or Colonial Wear.*
*Academical Robe Makers.*

TAILORS, SHIRTMAKERS, HOSIERS, HATTERS.

3 CORNMARKET, OXFORD.

TAILORS SINCE 1846.

# CASTELL & SON.

OUTFITTING ADDED IN 1873.

University and Clerical Tailors,
Robe Makers,
13 BROAD STREET, OXFORD.
(Opposite Balliol College).

Representatives of the Firm are frequently travelling, and appointments are respectfully solicited.

THE

# MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 1. APRIL, 1923. Vol. XIII.

## SIGNS OF THE TIMES

'No Dogmas No Deans.'

The only live subject in the religious world to-day is Modernism. To some it is the savour of life unto life, and to others it is the savour of death unto death. This is not surprising, as the term is vague, and Modernism means different things to different minds. We observe, however, that there is a growing conviction on the part of religious teachers that it is a subject which cannot be ignored.

The Dean of Worcester (Dr. Moore Ede), in a recent series of lectures in his cathedral city, began the course with 'Modernism, its Merits and its Dangers.'

The *Worcester Herald*, which reported the lecture at length, states that:

The Dean opened his address with a defence of the Modernist. He said that when the Modern Churchmen held their conference at Cambridge, published extracts and sentences of speeches, torn from their context, gave many people a shock. It seemed as if they were denying and explaining away the Christian religion, but Modernists were as convinced Christians as any. They did not want to destroy the old truths, but to re-state them, because the old statements were antiquated and out of harmony with modern ways of thought and expression. Modernism stood for a new spirit, and for modern methods in the study and teaching of religion and ethics. It did not offer a new set of dogmas, but it asked for a modern interpretation of the older ones. It sought to meet difficulties already raised by our modern world view, rather than to raise new ones. It left our personal relation with Christ untouched.

It was necessary in our day to re-state the statements and conceptions of Christian theology, because our whole conception of the universe and our mode of thought had been revolutionized. The people called Modernists studied the results of the researches of modern scholars, and strove to remove the difficulties between ancient and modern knowledge without destroying the real spiritual significance of the ancient records.

336776

A whole system of theology had been built upon the story of Adam and Eve. On the narrative in *Genesis* theologians based their idea that man began his life in the world as an innocent, sinless being. We taught in our school text books that man never did live in a world without suffering, that he never was a perfectly good being, but that he began as a brute, and his whole history was his effort to subjugate the ape and the tiger. Man's first consciousness of sin, so far from being a fall, was the first step upward in his becoming a moral being.

Here was a serious conflict between theological teaching and modern knowledge. What was to be done? Modern knowledge was a rising tide of accumulating evidence which could not be ignored.

The Modernist, accepting the conclusions of modern knowledge, examined the story of the 'Fall,' and said the apparent conflict between theology and knowledge arose from theologians reading an allegory as if it were history. How it ever came to be taken for history was difficult to understand, for it had all the conventional symbolism. The interpretation of it as an allegory, and not as history, so far from destroying the spiritual value of the story, brought out its spiritual meaning. It was the most wonderful story of temptation ever written.

Having dealt at length with Modernism and the Old Testament, the Dean turned to the less well-worn theme of Modernism and the Traditional Theology. He had pointed out earlier in his lecture that the writer of the Fourth Gospel was a Modernist, who sought to present Jesus Christ, not in the current terms of Jewish Messianic expectation, but in the light of popular Greek thought, the Dean now proceeded to indicate that some of the forms of Greek thought in which later Christian theology had been expressed were not very helpful to the modern mind. He said :—

There were many questions concerning Christian theology about which controversy between the Traditionalist and Modernist was raging, but the most central concerned the Divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ. What the Modernists were trying to do was to deliver the conception of the Divinity from the grave-clothes of Greek thought and Greek terminology, and restate the Divinity in words and forms which a people brought up in the methods of science could understand. The Modernist might not always succeed. Some might, and did, allow their desire to be modern to carry them so far that they seemed to destroy ancient and fundamental truths.

Nevertheless, those who were striving to interpret the faith in the light of modern knowledge and modern scholarship, in terms of modern thought, were doing inestimable service. There were those who thought these attempts unsettling, and that silence would be wise. If no endeavour be made to interpret the old truths in modern terms, the youth of to-day would reject Christianity altogether. They had to think of the future.

The Deans of England still retain an honourable reputation for interest in the intellectual presentation of the Christian Religion. Without the Deans of Westminster, St. Paul's, and

Carlisle, we should be poor indeed. The Dean of Worcester is to be congratulated on treating the subject of Modernism so sympathetically in a city where the splendid pioneer work of Canon J. M. Wilson must have already won many to intelligent faith.

### The Faith in Action—Dr. Glover and Dr. Fosdick.

The Saturday articles in the *Times* and in the *Daily News* deserve the thanks of those who desire to see the Christian Religion presented in a reasonable and untechnical form to educated English readers. Dr. Glover's article in the *Daily News* of March 10 possesses particular interest as an *apologia pro fide sua*, or rather for his way of presenting it. He tells a tale, familiar to all religious publicists, of the amount of ill-informed correction which is daily received from anonymous correspondents, and is rightly alarmed at the instability of a religious faith which rests upon the supposed scientific and historic inerrancy of the Written Word. He writes :—

> I do not want to make my religion depend on a complicated structure of ancient texts and mediaeval or even modern scholarship.
>
> Religion must depend on something more verifiable than records attributed to Moses, or even (I will add) detached sayings attributed to Jesus. For someone (I forget who it was) said a wise thing—that we do better to judge and test the Evangelists by Jesus than to judge and test Jesus by the Evangelists. I find passages in the Gospels, very obviously in the vein of Jesus, to the effect that the outcome of a life and its fruit is what gives you the clue to the truth and value of a man's thoughts of God. Paul was of the same mind as Jesus; he found all corruption to be the outcome of a central false conception of God, and the fruits of the spirit he found in love, joy, self-control and meekness. With this test before me I find that some of the best Christians I have known were men singularly independent of Moses and Daniel and Jonah, and very little interested in them. I conclude that a literal acceptance of the Old Testament as history in every syllable is not a part of the Christian faith.
>
> But a lot of people say the opposite. Traditionalists and sceptics unite on that, and both groups have said it so long and said it so loud, that their statement has been widely heard and widely believed. 'Christianity,' accordingly, with many people, 'is believing all about Jonah and the whale and the axe that floated, and so on; an endorsement of every misconception of God that the Hebrews ever formed.' As a result they will hear no more about Jesus Christ. They suffer the loss; but the sin rests chiefly with the Traditionalists, who, too lazy and too cowardly to think, misrepresented God and made the Gospel ridiculous. They cannot blame the sceptics who took them at their word.
>
> There are three questions I would wish to put about 'the man in the street,' for whom my critics are so anxious: Why should his mind not be temporarily disquieted to obtain a higher view of Scripture and Christ

and God? How can anybody suggest that the average man is not aware of what science and scholarship are doing? Who are responsible for the ordinary man's damnation (if he really is ordinary, and if he is damned)—the people who by a false theory drove him from Christ or the scholars who tried to show the ordinary man that common honesty and common sense in historical and scientific research are not alien to faith in Christ?

In any case, I hope that, among those who have read these articles, some have seen all along that their purpose is constructive; that I have been trying to bring what I know to be a nobler and fuller view of Christian truth before people; that, above all things, I want to induce men and women to go themselves to fact and document and see whether the use of God-given faculty does not give them a larger and greater Christ to whom to commit themselves for life and eternity.

I believe that the modern scholar's attitude to religion is a more serious one than the old Traditionalism, with its fear of questions and its mental laziness, and that with every increase in seriousness the claims of Christ are felt to be more real.

The *Methodist Recorder*, which on February 22 contained an article headed 'The Trend of Modernism—A Limited God and an Empty Religion,' published on March 15 an able article in a different vein by Mr. A. G. Curnow, entitled 'Dr. Glover and his Critics.' In it Mr. Curnow expresses the view that the opposition of the Traditionalists has over-stepped the bounds of Christian charity, and that Dr. Glover has done well to declare open war upon them. He writes:—

It is lamentable that anyone who, like Dr. Glover, is doing his best to 'unite the pair so long disjoined—knowledge and vital piety,' should find himself subjected to an irritating fusilade of petty attacks. But there it is, and some of us are not altogether surprised. And I don't know that even such attacks are altogether to be regretted if they lead to articles so outspoken, so vigorous, and so brilliant as that of last Saturday. And more especially when they lead to a resolve like this: 'I am going to try,' says Dr. Glover, announcing his future policy, 'to rival the Traditionalists and their allies in emphasis, and even if necessary in loudness, to the effect that the gifts of Jesus Christ are not conditional on a man's acceptance of any theory of verbal inspiration . . . I believe that a thoroughgoing acceptance of modern critical methods is not inconsistent with a genuine Evangelicalism, and is the real reply to cheap atheism and lazy indifference.'

Certainly the time had come. The extent to which the vital religion of Jesus Christ is, in this country and in these days, tied to intellectual obscurantism and to exploded views of the universe, is lamentable.

Mr. Curnow next proceeds to deal with the tremendous efforts being put forth by the Traditionalists to check Modernism.

The fact is—and we may as well face it—that what we are up against in this country (and apparently still more so in America) is a determined and well-organized attempt on the part of the forces of reaction to capture the whole of the Christian position. Of course they won't do it—*magna*

*est veritas et praevalebit*—but it is more than likely that their propaganda will do much harm unless it is met by one equally determined. To read of a heresy-hunt against a splendid Christian teacher like Dr. Fosdick, whose books have perhaps done more for the spread of the Kingdom of God in our generation than those of any other writer, with the possible exception of Dr. Glover himself, makes the ordinary man rub his eyes. And when one is told of people who, at this time of day, sixty-four years after 1859, make the anathematizing of the word 'evolution' the open sesame into the Heavenly Kingdom, one wonders if it isn't all an incredible dream. Any minister can testify to the prodigious amount of literature which pours through his letter-box, having for its avowed purpose the re-imposing upon Christianity of burdens which, in the good providence of God and through the devoted labours of saintly scholars during the last couple of generations, have been on the point of disappearing. The amount of ingenuity and assiduity expended in this misguided enterprise is a thing to make the angels weep.

A pitiable feature of this retrograde campaign is the maligning of honest scholars to which it leads. This is what Dr. Glover says on the point: 'I know what scholars are, and I also know personally many men of science. Instead of finding them markedly worse than traditionalist theologians and ordinary people, I find them very often more candid, more keen upon truth, simpler, and a great deal more humble. The great scholars are not the arrogant dogmatists that outsiders suppose.' Of course they are not. People who originate such tales simply don't know the men they are traducing.

Some of the humblest, sincerest, and finest Christians of the day are to be found in the ranks of the 'advanced' scholars. 'I cannot think,' says Dr. Glover, 'that to Jesus of Nazareth they would have been repellent; I think He would again and again have found them congenial.' How *can* anyone think otherwise? But that many do is sufficiently obvious.

One important aspect of this whole question is its relation to the man in the pulpit. Those of us who in these days are trying to do anything to fulfil the *teaching* function of the pulpit know how grievously we are suffering from what we cannot help regarding as the mistaken timidity of the preachers of the last generation or so.

We to-day are reaping the harvest, and it is a sad one. The Bible, to many of our educated people, is an unreal book. And if the policy of those who are attacking Dr. Glover is to prevail, it will become an unreal book to an increasing number. We want to get people to see that the Bible is, in the words of Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, 'the most majestic thing in our literature, and by all odds the most spiritually living thing we inherit,' and we shall never do it along the lines of reactionary obscurantism. In this connection the indignant words of Dean Inge in his latest book come to my mind: 'The worst enemies of Christianity are Christians . . . When traditional orthodoxy provokes the moral indignation of the enlightened conscience, and when it outrages our sense of truth and honesty by demanding our assent to scientific errors which were exploded centuries ago, then indeed the Church is in danger.'

It is the future of the traditionalist Churches, not the future of Modernism, which is in danger. At present it may be the Traditionalists among practising Christians are as ten to one

compared with the Modernists, yet the Traditionalists are as men armed with bows and arrows contending against machine-guns. It is only their great number, the darkness of the night, and the heaps of 'loose-stones' which encumber the *terrain*, which give them a temporary advantage, which will disappear for ever with the dawn.

The attempted prosecution of Dr. Fosdick for heresy may well amaze the readers of his able and popular books who do not realise the temper of the ecclesiastical dogmatist. The student of Church History, however, will regard the prosecution as quite natural. What will really seem unnatural to him is that the attempt should have failed. Yet things in the religious line appear to be moving rapidly in America. We have been informed that in that country even Bishops are seeking admission to the Modern Churchmen's Union.

### The Catholic Church *in parvo*.

Dr. Temple is commonly credited with having coined the epigram, 'I believe One Catholic and Apostolic Church, but regret that at present it does not exist.' The *Christian Patriot*, an ably edited South Indian newspaper, recently published an account of the formation of a religious society which breathes something of that spirit of comprehensiveness which must permeate the reunited Church of the future. Its dogmatic conditions of membership are as follows:

> The *only* condition of membership is *'Faith in and devotion to Jesus Christ.'* Members may belong to any nationality, but they shall consider themselves as citizens of the Kingdom of God, placing loyalty to Christ above everything.
>
> At the same time this is not an attempt to start any new sect, rather it is an attempt to unite in loving fellowship and service members of all Christian denominations, moved by common ideals of service for the advent of the Kingdom of their Lord.

There is an attractive air of Catholicity about this society's outlook and its terms of subscription, which is very refreshing. There is, however, no immediate prospect of its becoming world-embracing. This may be because it insists also on celibacy and poverty. The writer tells the story of its progress in the next sentence:

> 'At present the only two permanent members are medical men, and the only form of service possible for them is naturally medical.'

Nevertheless, we venture to predict that the pressure of the Traditionalist on the Modernist will in the end reduce the *credenda* of the Catholic Church of the future to those of this newly-formed Indian brotherhood, and this indeed will be no great dogmatic loss, for we shall then have come back to the identical dogmatic demand with which the Christian Church began its career, and which it is a great pity it was ever led to enlarge in its desire to exclude heretics. When that day dawns we shall also find that with this simplification of the dogmatic demand, the problem of reunion will have become simplified.

**Pulpit Politics.**

The Church of England used to be called 'the Conservative Party at prayer.' That jibe has long since ceased to be true. It would be as bad for the State as for the Church if all the clergy belonged to one political party, and we are glad that it is no longer the case. The recent presentation of a congratulatory address to the leaders of the Labour Party, signed by some five hundred of those whom Dean Inge has named 'the Court Chaplains to King Demos,' has raised in an acute form the question of the part which the clergyman should play in political life. Many laymen who would have praised the signatories had they signed addresses to the leaders of the Liberal or Conservative Parties have nothing but condemnation for the clergy who have dared to address in laudatory language the leader of the Labour Party. Whilst it is recognized in clerical circles that the judicious clerical support of political leaders or, better still, of political measures in times of crises is a road to promotion, it is to the credit of the clergy that, as a whole, it is not one which they readily adopt. The majority of the clergy, save in those political crises where they believe the Church or Christian morals to be in danger, 'keep out of politics,' and also 'keep politics out of the pulpit.' They feel that to be known adherents of a political party must needs alienate them in some measure from those of their parishioners who are strong supporters of their political opponents. They feel also that to use the pulpit in Nonconformist fashion at general elections to secure the return of a particular political party, is to misuse the pulpit. The hustings and the public platform are rightly used

for this purpose, but the Christian pulpit they feel is intended and should only be used for teaching and exhortations of quite another kind. Yet in the light of the modern study of the prophets of Israel, for whom the pulpit and politics were interchangeable terms, and who recognized no separation between social policy and religious obligation, they would find it difficult to justify the separation. Persons of weight tell us to-day that if the Gospel is not a social Gospel, it is nothing; that if the Church has no message to deliver in such matters as sweating, profiteering, indecent and immoral housing conditions, public education, popular amusements, the exploitation of backward races, international peace, militarism, patriotism, the responsibilities of property-holders, the liquor licensing regulations, the white-slave traffic, hideous advertisements, political corruption, civic sloth, and so on, it has not a Gospel which will seem to be of any significance at all to many persons of goodwill in our communities; that a Gospel which deals simply with the relation of the individual soul to God, and the use of this life as a place of probation and education for a future life, is less than the Gospel of Christ—which included the obligation of loving one's neighbour as oneself—and it is added that this obligation of loving one's neighbour as oneself is the ground for Christian clergymen teaching the whole social Gospel. Most modern-minded educated Churchmen will admit the cogency of these arguments, and yet affirm that the pulpit ought not to be used for politics, and that the clergy ought not to be political partisans. On the one hand, it is intolerable to have the distinctive message of Christ's Gospel identified with the jarring notes and wearisome shibboleths of political controversy; on the other hand, it is worse to have the clergy of the National Church silent in the face of social injustice and dumbly acquiescent in the presence of conditions which are hostile to morality and social progress. What is the right line of conduct for the clergyman? It seems to us to have been taken by the late Bishop Westcott, of Durham, in the coal mines dispute in his diocese, and by the part played by the Bishop of Norwich in the recent farm labourers' strike. In the *Times* of March 28th, Dr. Pollock relates that he hospitably entertained the representatives of both parties in the dispute, and provided in Norwich

Palace 'a neutral ground . . . amidst the associations belonging to a historic house,' which 'would render it easier to make a fresh start with fresh and open minds.' He adds:

> In the discussions themselves I took no part, wishing to observe a neutral attitude, friendly all round. Moreover, I do not believe that we of the clergy do any good if we try to lay down any rules or regulations and declare that they ought to govern the practice of employers, for example, by maintaining that wages ought to represent such and such a percentage in industry. As prices are determined by world-wide causes and international competition, we cannot use language that seems to assume that the clergy or the employers can rule the whole situation. It is wiser that we should leave the details to the experts, and concentrate our efforts on creating a wholesome public opinion. We can use our influence to create, or re-create, an attitude of peace and good will, and to make it plain that sympathy and trust evoke trustworthiness, and, in a happy circle, no less does trustworthiness evoke trust.

The social and industrial conditions in any community depend upon two classes of factors which react on each other. These are (1) economic material and economic laws, and (2) the characters and habits of those individuals who constitute the economic community. With the first the clergy, as clergymen, have nothing to do; the second is their field. Where the individuals of a community possess that true Christian culture which makes them sensitive to injustice, inhumanity, wastefulness, folly, vulgarity and ugliness, we shall find a steady improvement in the social and industrial conditions which either tolerate or seem to encourage these enemies of the good and the beautiful. This outlook, which makes us see in a nation's industrial conditions and in its social life a reflection of the soul of the individuals which compose the nation, is the only sound one. At present the popular tendency is to separate social conditions from moral character, and assume that a political revolution or an industrial revolution would produce those ideal conditions of life which can only be produced by a moral, mental, and aesthetic conversion of the individuals who compose the community. But to produce this kind of change in a community is so slow, and hard, and painful, and disappointing, a business that we are always on the look out for 'The Great Backstairs,' or any other seductive short-cut, which will provide us with a Christian Paradise without putting us to the trouble of creating Christians to dwell in it.

# THE OUTLOOK

By the Editor.

AS with this number the *Modern Churchman* enters on its thirteenth year, it is permissible once again to take stock of the situation. It is apparent to any observant reader of the English Press that considerably more attention is being devoted to Church news than was the case in 1921. This is particularly conspicuous in the case of Roman Catholic news which seems able to secure a prominence for itself out of all proportion to the number of its adherents in this country, although not out of proportion to its growing influence and its political activities.

Bishop Neville Talbot in his recent book, *The Returning Tide of Faith*, takes a hopeful view of the religious situation. He writes :—

> 'The Christian Faith is coming again. Such—despite the many disappointments and perpexities of to-day—is my conviction' (p. xii).

And he gives as his verdict that

> 'The number of unthinking Christians has decreased and must decrease' (p. vii).

This we believe to be true, meanwhile Romanism and Secularism are on the increase. This is due mainly to the failure of a reasonable and enlightened Christianity to secure a common policy and platform. The Church of England which ought to be leading in this crusade is painfully divided between traditionalist and modernist ideals. Modernism is officially very weak, although a recent book of essays by influential Evangelicals is a welcome sign that the younger and more virile members of that School are becoming imbued with the Modernist spirit.[1] Traditionalism, which is highly organized and is mainly represented by the older clergy, controls the Church's machinery and resources. The great bulk of nominal Churchmen, who are all potential, and in some cases even actual, Modernists, are too indifferent, too indolent, too ignorant, or too indignant, to take any active part in getting themselves and their Church ideals properly represented where such representation will tell. The

[1] *Liberal Evangelicalism*, pub. Hodder and Stoughton, 6/- net (1923).

whole problem for those who wish well unto our Zion, is to know how to secure this, for if it be not achieved the gap between Church and Nation must grow wider and wider as in France.

Unfortunately, in a number of parishes the parishioners have been driven from their parish churches by Romanizing practices and Romanizing teaching,[2] and the bishops are either not aware of what is taking place or are too timid, or too pacific, or in a few cases too much in sympathy with what is being done to check the movement. The proposal to allow the parishioners by the means of their parish councils any real power to prohibit successfully liturgical novelties in the parish church is one which neither the majority of the episcopate nor of the clergy appear to favour.

There is a danger that the Life and Liberty Movement, which is to-day one of the most promising influences in the Church Assembly, having failed in its well-meant endeavours to increase the power of the laity, may end by transferring the powers of the cathedral and parochial clergy to the episcopate. In all disputes between clergy and laity, it should not be forgotten that the bishop is the residuary legatee. Power has a tendency to pass into his hands, and those who desire a constitutional episcopate and not an autocratic prelacy would do well to remember this. It is interesting to observe that the recent discussion about patronage has led some of the episcopate, which at present holds the lion's share of Church patronage, to demand a yet larger share, in the interests of the Church.

The dangerous Church policy of centralisation has, we hope, been checked. The opposition of the diocesan authorities, and the mismanagement of some of their undertakings by the central authorities, have weakened it. One thing that the Church needs in order to be strong in the country is a local Church government which does not consist in the autocracy of the parish priest. Real government by parochial church councils of co-operating clergy and laity may be despised as parochialism but where guided and encouraged by able and popular bishops, it will produce the very best results. At present the Church Assem-

[2] We hope that the vigorous and understanding protest against Romanism in the English Church recently voiced by Bishop Walter Carey in his *Conversion, Catholicism, and the English Church* (Mowbray, 2/- net. 1923) will receive the attention it deserves.

bly's ideal of local Church Government seems to be limited to the raising of quotas by the parishes, and the spending of them by the central authority.

Whilst the national desire for intelligent and comprehensive Churchmanship is growing, that ideal is largely unorganised and is strongest outside the boundaries of practising Churchmanship. Hence the problem which besets the Life and Liberty Movement, the Churchmen's Union, and other liberal organisations, is how to remedy this. The Life and Liberty Movement seems to believe that to abolish the remnants of simony without being able to abolish nepotism, to elect bishops by synodical suffrage, to alter the present system of Church patronage, to sub-divide dioceses, to prepare for Church Disestablishment, to support Prayer-book revision, is the best method: the Churchmen's Union has advocated Prayer-book revision for years, but it is not much interested in, and is even in some cases, opposed to, the other *desiderata* of the Life and Liberty Movement.

The Churchmen's Union desires more than anything else the education of a liberally minded clergy, the promotion of re-union with English Protestant Dissenters, the real representation of the laity with real powers of local church government, the simplification of the Church's *credenda*, and a revision of the Prayer-book which would permit large liberty of alternative services subject always to parochial and episcopal veto.

As those who desire the welfare of the English Church we would advocate closer relations between the Churchmen's Union and the Life and Liberty Movement. It is possible that each group has qualities which may supply the defects of the other. We must have a definitely liberal theology inculcated by sermons and inspired by services which will make it a living power. Until we have that we shall not secure a ministry capable of influencing the English people as a whole. When we have it in England it will spread rapidly through the Dominions and in the United States of America. The turning away of the best type of young Englishman from Holy Orders is one of the most alarming signs of the times. The Knutsford effort was indeed commendable, but it is now past. The future can alone decide whether it has been a success. Certainly Mr. Barry's energy

and imagination, and idealism, did all that could be done on those lines; but the present outlook is gloomy.

In studious colleges in Oxford where formerly there were bred excellent candidates for Holy Orders, there are none to-day. From the Public Schools few, very few indeed, are entering the sacred ministry of the Church. The Headmaster of a great public school with a fine religious tradition told us lately that there were three reasons for this:

(1) The lack of courageous liberal leadership on the part of the episcopate, and combined with this the obvious obscurantism of many of the clergy.

(2) The growing conviction on the part of earnest young men that they can do better work for humanity outside the Church's ministry than within it.

(3) The poor financial prospects of the clergyman who has no private means.

The third reason he confessed weighed more heavily with the parents than with their sons. It should be noted, however, that this is being steadily remedied by the judicious financial policy of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners in comparison with which the much advertised efforts of the Central Church Fund were as a drop in the bucket.

What is clear is that the Church has got a not undeserved reputation for obscurantism and bumbledom, which it will require very definite and conspicuous episcopal efforts to overcome in the public mind. Yet it is only just to observe that a liberal note has characterised a number of prominent episcopal utterances during recent years, although not a few of the clergy appear to be becoming more and more obscurantist, and so are able to check a liberal policy; and it is these rather than the bishops who are responsible for our bad reputation with the people. Yet the Bishops need to be much more plain-spoken in their Liberalism. If they desire educated modern-minded young men to become candidates for ordination, they must not be afraid to speak, not as those who *condone* or *tolerate* theological and ecclesiastical Liberalism, but as those who *welcome* it. Recently a candidate for Orders told his Bishop that he could only be ordained on the clear understanding that his views of Christian

Dogma were those of Professor Bethune-Baker, as expressed in his book on the Apostles' Creed. The Bishop answered without hesitation: 'That's all right.' Yet we doubt if that excellent prelate would say the same thing from the pulpit quite plainly and freely to the undergraduate world. It would make all the difference if he and his episcopal brethren would make a practice of doing so.

Bishop Headlam has recently told us that what the Church of England needs at the present time is not more activity, but more intelligence; but what it also needs is courage—courage which believes in the truth and in the value of telling the truth even when it conflicts with tradition.

The outlook for the Church of England is dark until those in authority can shew modern-minded men of good will and independent spirit that it is possible to pursue a very useful and honourable career in the ministry of the Church without any stifling either of thought or utterance. The advice of Tennyson's farmer to the curate: 'Creep along hedge-bottoms and you'll be a bishop yet,' when combined with poor pay and precarious prospects fails to secure potential spiritual and moral and mental leaders for the Church. Yet salvation is found not in measures but in men.

# THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND REUNION

By Miss M. D. Petre, author of the *Life of George Tyrrell.*

'Si ergo vultis vivere de Spiritu Sancto tenete charitatem, amate veritatem, desiderate unitatem, ut perveniatis ad aeternitatem.'
(St. Augustine, *Sermo* cclxvii—*In die Pentecostes*).

## I.

WHATEVER its failings, all I think would agree that the Roman Catholic Church is the true representative of the Christian Church according to its mediaeval conception. If we turn to St. Thomas Aquinas, or to Dante, we find a truly regal conception of the Church as the mystical body of all mankind, of which mystical body Christ is the Head.

Everybody belongs to the Church *in potentia* if not *in actu;* she is the Mistress of all, whether they obey her or not.

It must never be forgotten that, according to the classic Christian teaching, the Incarnation is universal in extent and value. One of the chief objections of the Church to the Copernican system of astronomy was the possibility it raised of inhabited worlds to which the merits of Christ could not extend. The Body of the Church, says Aquinas, 'is constituted of all men, from the beginning of the world to the end'; some are members of Christ in act, some only in possibility, but until the final judgment all are members in one way or the other There is only one mystical Church, and everybody belongs to it; and there is, according to the same mediaeval and classic doctrine, only one Visible Church, which is outer presentment of the inner and mystical Church. The scheme is perfectly logical and consistent given the doctrinal basis on which it rests.

But the division amongst Christian Churches has transformed and obscured this theory. There is now more than one visible representative of the mystical body, and those representatives claim, each one, its own right of existence, while this multiplicity is reflected in the conception of the mystical body also.

Thus we have reached a condition in which it might be said that the Christian religion is one, but that the Christian Churches are many.

The mediaeval conception was excessive in its claims, yet there was a grandeur in its excess. According to that conception the Kingdom of the Church was the soul of man, the souls of all mankind; no compromise was admissible. The visible framework stood for an invisible one, as vast as the world itself. *Urbi et Orbi*—the City was as wide as the world, and the world was as wide as all creation.

It is this very claim to universality that is now one great obstacle to the union of Christian Churches. The existing Roman Catholic Church claims to be the only true lineal descendant and rightful heir of the mediaeval Church, and she stands out for the old claim—all or nothing.

As compromise is the characteristic of the English Church, so a spirit of exclusiveness, finality and definiteness is a main

characteristic of the Roman Catholic Church—a characteristic, indeed, which so much impresses outsiders that they will often not seek to know anything more about her. In this characteristic is her strength, in it, also, is her weakness. In virtue of her uncompromisingness she holds tight what she has; she keeps within her hold the slippery, elusive subjects that wander from Church to Church until they chance to fall, and then for good and all, into her bottomless reservoir; she maintains her even tenour midst the changes and revolutions of life and thought; she remains fast and impregnable. By reason of that same uncompromisingness she also cuts herself off from rich supplies of human life; she sacrifices great fields of conquest; she roots out much of the very best of her own life.

What is Compromise?

'Compromise is Satan,' said the Brand of Ibsen.

'*One day you must awaken; one day, ennobled, you must break peace with compromise; arise from your miserable plight; arise out of your paralysing incompleteness; smite your enemy in the face; declare war against him to the death.*'

But the form of compromise which the English Church would admit as her characteristic is something more subtle and complex and suspective of moral qualifications than the Compromise of Ibsen; and so, too, is the form of compromise which the Church of Rome repudiates. Indeed, there are moments in her life when she dallies with the spirit of worldly compromise, though never with any compromise as to her position and claims.

In what, then, does her uncompromisingness consist at its best? In what does it consist at its worst? At its best it consists in her profound belief in her own mission as the one sure entrance to the world of supersensible and eternal realities; in her unshakeable confidence in the supreme importance of her own task; in her maintenance of spiritual values that no change of human thought or fashion can affect; in her grim preparedness to live on a waste heap rather than renounce one iota of the work which was, as she holds, divinely committed to her.

At its worst it consists in a stubborn blindness to the life and needs around her; in an arrogance which is the vicious extreme of belief in her destiny, and which leads her to set

herself forth as the end where she is in truth but the means; in a rigidity which is a result of her indócility; in a proud indifference to all that is not her direct concern; in an isolation from mankind in general and from that humanity which she should link with the divine.

In her uncompromisingness, then, is the secret of her strength, but in her uncompromisingness, also, might well be hidden the secret of her death, unless she can justify her action by the results.

The immediate advantages of the uncompromising attitude are those of the Die-Hard in politics. It gives confidence and satisfaction to the strong, blunt temperament, while it imparts to the weak that sense of seclusion and security which is, truly, the sense of Home.

It is productive of a sense of environment in which the soul can flourish, and grow strong.

It is, as we have just suggested, the correlative of a profound sense of universal significance, of a call to guide and teach all mankind, of an unique possession of eternal truth. The Roman Catholic Church will not admit of a difference in faith which does not also constitute an opposition; nor will she sacrifice the least particle of what she believes to be the doctrine committed to her by Christ.

This unbounded confidence in her own mission has worked out to results not less than scandalous in certain cases. The *non possumus* of Pius IX, in regard to the fate of a little child, that had been baptized into the Catholic Church, was one such instance. It was logical, according to the teaching of the Catholic Church; it was monstrous, according to the teaching of Humanity. Thus we come to the point at which the uncompromising claim to supremacy must be modified, for until the Church is as wide as humanity she must admit that humanity has its own, and sometimes separate, rights.

Once again she must take her lessons from the starlit sky—she must sit, with Augustine, at the window and realize the relativity of all that this world contains to the eternal order. That eternal order, itself, is beyond her full comprehension; but what she does, or ought to, know is that she is set *in* it, and not *around* it; sacred as her mission may be, she is the contained

and not the container; the means and not the end. Like the Sabbath, she was made for man; though, like the Sabbath, she represents those ends to which all humanity must tend. Uncompromising in her maintenance of the spiritual element in man, of the spiritual world around him, she can be rightly compromising in the means which she offers him for the fulfilment of his spiritual destiny. Rightly supreme in her teaching of eternal truths, she can be teachable in relation to the progressive knowledge and experience of mankind. Rightly proud of her position of mediatrix between the worldly and super-worldly interests of men, she can be humble as one that has come rather to serve than to rule.

*That was the Spirit of Compromise*, said Brand. *It begged for my little finger that it might clutch my whole hand.*

But at the last his uncompromising will is translated into a wider setting.

*The time of frost endures throughout the Law; at last the summer sun streams from on high. Until to-day my aim was to become a table whereon God could write; from to-day my life's register must bend, and melt, and overflow. The crust is breaking, I can weep; I can kneel down; I can pray.*

## II.

What, then, are we to say as to the great question of reunion?

To us, members of the uncompromising Church, it is pain, even more than it is joy, to read the touching words of Lord Halifax in his recent Call to Reunion.

> 'May I, on the last occasion that I am likely to address my fellow Churchmen . . . urge them to labour for that unity which is so near to the heart of our Lord and Saviour.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> 'May the Great Head of the Church so inspire Pius XI that, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, who alone can make men to be of one mind in one house, he shall so work and pray that there may be again one fold and one Shepherd.'

And if these words give us pain, it is not because we fail to appreciate their noble character, but because we realize the horrible difficulty of their fulfilment. The other side offers

so much, and we seem to concede nothing at all; our only reply being an unqualified demand for total submission.

We may sometimes feel tempted to say to our Anglican friends: *Go your own way, seek reunion with all the other Churches—with ours you can do nothing;* but, after all, what kind of reunion would it be without us? Without the largest and the strongest portion of Christianity?

All life tends to union, and to acquiesce permanently in differences that constitute opposition and hostility, is to claim less for religion than for any other department of life, while to put off the resolution of those differences to the next world is but a method of evasion.

Perhaps we shall find, eventually, that the union of Churches is, like the union of nations, a result that will never be secured by direct effort, nor by the action of authority; that it will come about by a long and gradual process of amalgamation rather than by adjustment and compromise, and by the action of the faithful rather than by that of their rulers. Already, though the walls of separation exist, they are perceptibly thinner and may crack at the moment we least expect.

Many of us know that there are souls in rival Churches with which our own have far closer affinity than with the majority of our co-religionists. Just as the highest values of life are those which lie beyond racial and national ambitions, so the highest religious values are those which are sought by members of every Church and every religion.

And meanwhile though reunion cannot be wrought by individual members of a Church, even by a great number of them, there is nothing to forbid such associations for religious ends as could prepare the way for a more complete fusion.

It has always seemed to me that the most potent form of a League of Nations would be one that had no official character or mandate; for the official elements of all institutions are necessarily representative of their rival or even their opposing interests.

So also I think that informal associations, with no doctrinal disciplinary authority, might prepare the way for Church reunion. Their members need not sacrifice an iota of loyalty to their own Church, but they could join with members of another

Church for such religious interests as are common to all. In this way the heart-ache of inactive waiting for something that is slow to come would be saved, and unnoticed progress would be achieved.

Perhaps Dante was right in his conception of a human totality constituted of one Church as of one empire, and perhaps we cannot have complete religious unity without its counter-part of political and social unity. After all, what is to be said for a universal Church that cannot hinder wars of extermination between the nations that belong to it. Dante conceived of a world-wide empire in which war would have no place. Unless a Church did as much as this her unity would be null so far as this world and this life are concerned.

In the late war even the uncompromising Roman Catholic Church sacrificed her unity to national interests, and French Catholics were at one with French Protestants, while they declared open hatred of German Catholics.

The Church is for all mankind; but it is impossible for her to fulfil this universal mission until humanity itself has reached a higher degree of charity. It should be, to the Church herself, a wholesome lesson of her dependence on mankind. Her own ideals remain unfulfilled until the world of men and women is ripe for their fulfilment.

The Church is our Beatrice, but she is a Beatrice of this world, as well as of the next; she shares its weakness and its limitations. She is the messenger of eternal and infinite love, but her power of giving is in proportion to man's power of receiving.

*Ecco chi crescerà i nostri amori!* She points the way to goods that are not lessened by participation; to riches in which there is no rivalry. In proportion as men realize that the best things in life are those which are open to all and to which the material possessions of life are subsidiary, will national and social warfare cease, and the goods of earth be apportioned according to the general needs.

It is the task of the Church to help on this process by shedding on time the light of eternity; on earth the light of heaven. She has to look upward—we have to look at her; *Beatrice in suso, ed io in lei guardava.*

# WHAT IS THE CHURCH?*

By Hastings Rashdall, D.D., D.Litt., D.C.L., F.B.A., Dean of Carlisle.

WAS the Church founded by Christ Himself? That is a question to which it is eminently desirable we should be able to give a clear and definite answer; for the answer we give to it will determine our attitude towards many questions of actual and pressing importance. We all know the two rival traditional answers. On the one hand, there have always been religious people who have been disposed to think of our Lord as having addressed himself primarily to individuals. According to them, His object was to convert individual men and women and to turn them into individual followers of Himself. After His departure from this world it has been supposed that His followers came together and formed themselves into an organised body or a number of local bodies, chose for themselves officials, ministers, preachers, who devoted themselves in a special way to the task of preaching the Gospel to Jew and heathen, and of edifying those who were already converts. But the Church was simply the aggregate of individual disciples, or, perhaps, as some would say, of the individual men and women who were hereafter to be saved. And even now, being a Christian and being a member of the Church or of a church, are, according to this view, quite different things. A man can become a Christian without having anything to do with the Church or any church. When he has become a Christian, then he may consider the question of associating himself with some body or other of Christians as an aid to his edification and to doing his Master's work in the world; or he may attach himself to no such body and remain just a Christian at large, a friend of all Churches, a member of none. That is one view of the matter.

On the other hand, there are those who think that the Master from the first conceived of Himself as deliberately founding a

*Delivered in St. Paul's Church, Covent Garden, at Mid-day, on January 23rd, being the third of a series of Addresses under the auspices of the Churchmen's Union.

great world-wide society, membership in which and submission to which was an essential, perhaps the most essential, part of what is meant by being a Christian. He appointed twelve Apostles and afterwards seventy others, and conferred upon them authority, not merely to preach and to teach, but to rule and especially to determine what was to be the means of becoming a Christian. He enjoined that the Apostles should have power by the laying-on of hands to transmit their powers to successors, who were hereafter called Bishops, and to confer subordinate powers upon the successors of the seventy, who came to be known as presbyters or priests, and upon others who were called deacons. Without these three orders no Church could be a Church. A Church that has once broken the apostolic succession, a Church which has no Bishops or no apostolically succeeded bishops, is no Church at all; communion in such a body confers no grace, no true participation in the Body and Blood of Christ; its ministers are no ministers. According to this conception, a man can no more be a Christian without being a member, an obedient and submissive member, of the Church, than he can be a soldier of the King without belonging to the Army and obeying its officers. And by the Church is meant a perfectly definite organization, with its legislative assemblies, its executive officials, its courts of justice, its code of rules governing both conduct and belief. The Church, in short, is a kind of spiritual State, whose constitution has for ever been fixed by Christ Himself, whose rules were in part actually given it by Christ Himself, and in part were due to those officials whom He had endowed with the power of infallibility deciding what was to be believed and of issuing commands which, if not as infallible as the doctrine, were at least to be obeyed and submitted to as implicitly as if they had been issued by our Lord Jesus Christ Himself.

Which of these views shall we adopt? I have purposely stated them in a slightly exaggerated way, which would perhaps hardly be accepted without qualification by modern representatives of these two views, but that I have done to put the issue clearly. Our answer must in part depend upon the view we take of certain critical questions. The passages in which our Lord explicitly refers to the Church are all found in the Gospel of

St. Matthew alone; that is so with regard to the passage in which He speaks of founding His Church upon the rock of St. Peter, and the passage in which He requires His followers to bring their quarrels to be settled by the Church, and lays down the momentous doctrine that whoso will not listen to the Church shall be treated as a heathen man and a publican. These passages are found in St. Matthew's Gospel alone, and that of course, to many critics is the latest of the three Synoptic Gospels. Some quite conservative scholars would say that it belongs, in its present form, to the early part of the second century. At all events, it was most certainly not written by St. Matthew himself. Many of the passages which are found only in this Gospel bear indications of having been coloured or modified by later traditional amplifications, by the usages and organizations and beliefs of the later Church; and of no passage in the Gospel surely can this be said with more confidence than of these passages about the Church. It is surely most improbable that our Lord would have used a technical term, Ecclesia, which could have had no meaning for his original hearers, or have told His disciples to bring their quarrels to be decided by an organization which did not then exist. Of course, it is true that some saying of our Lord may have lain at the basis of those sayings. A good deal of light might be thrown upon the matter if we knew what was the original Aramaic word which is for us translated Ecclesia or Church. But in its present form the saying is surely one which we cannot trust.

Now, if when you ask whether Christ founded the Church you mean 'Did He contemplate the existence of an elaborate, organized, world-wide society, with a fixed and unalterable constitution, with its officials, assemblies, Church courts, and the like?' we can most confidently say: 'Certainly not': if we put away these passages, and even if we did not, the answer would be very much the same. There is not the slightest trace of anything of the kind. The notion is completely unhistorical. If you look more closely at the injunctions which He gave to His disciples, which are sometimes called the great ministerial commissions, you will see that they are really addressed to the whole body of His disciples. That is so even with the famous passage about binding and loosing: 'Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth

shall be bound in heaven'—though that, too, belongs to this doubtful section of the first Gospel. It is quite arbitrary to say that those words, if they were spoken by our Lord Himself, were addressed only to the clergy: as arbitrary as it would be to say that the words which immediately follow about the answer promised to the prayer of two or three means two or three bishops or two or three clergymen.

True, our Lord is recorded to have chosen twelve Apostles. He ordained twelve that they should be with Him and that He might send them forth 'to preach and to have power to heal sickness and to cast out devils.' To preach and to heal—that was the commission of Christ to the twelve. Nothing is said about the power to rule over other Christians. They were very emphatically told they should not be called Masters or Rabbis. Nor is there a word about infallibly determining questions of doctrine; still less is there the smallest suggestion that they had any power of handing on to others such authority as they themselves possessed. True, there is the promise that Christ's own presence, the Spirit of God, should be with His disciples, not with the twelve alone, and lead them to all truth. Much the same promise is made to every group of two or three Christians gathered together in Christ's name. 'Where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.' Nobody will surely suggest that every gathering of two or three Christians is infallible. And let me add—for this is important, in view of some pleas that are often made for ancient Councils and modern Convocations or Synods or Church Assemblies—that no word is ever said by our Lord Himself nor is in any part of the New Testament about the authority of the majority to bind the minority. There is no support in the New Testament for the notion that men can arrive at infallible oracles or at absolutely binding rules of action, by the process of counting heads, whether of bishops or presbyters or laymen.

In this sense Christ did not found the Church; and yet there is a sense in which Christ Himself most certainly did found the Church—a most important sense. Perhaps it is not a very great exaggeration to say, with M. Loisy—now, alas, lost to his own Church and to all Churches—that the most important thing that

Jesus did was to found a Church. He did, in point of fact, gather round Him a body of disciples—learners, pupils—and they were not merely disciples but helpers in that task of preaching the good news, of preaching the Kingdom of God, to which He devoted His own life on earth. He does habitually treat them as a brotherhood, a band of men marked off from the rest of the world just by the fact of being His disciples, and trying at least to practise the mode of life which He set before them. As a matter of simple historical fact, that little society which Christ did indeed found has grown and developed into the Christian Church. He left it to organize itself. Orders of the ministry, governing assemblies, modes of worship, rites, and ceremonies, all these He left them to arrange for themselves. They have grown up gradually; they have never been the same at all times and in all places. The same authority which made them has the power to alter them. Organization was absolutely necessary. It was quite impossible that that little band of brothers should have been able to spread in a century or so throughout the whole Roman Empire, in three centuries to conquer that Empire, in a century or two more to make itself the accepted religion of the whole Western civilized world—it was quite impossible that it should have done all these things without organization, without a ministry, without meetings. We do not belittle the Church, even if we think of it as a concrete visible organization, by insisting that it has grown, that it has changed, that it is always growing and changing. We are familiar at the present day with the thought that the greatest things in the world, the greatest systems of thought, the greatest ideas are not made, but grow. The Christian Church is a product of evolution. It has grown out of the seed which was sown by Christ Himself. All its vitality is derived from the teaching, the example, the character of its Founder. In that sense the Church was founded by Christ Himself, and must always remain the same. Only in so far as it remains true to the spirit of its Founder; only in so far as it is re-producing not only in its forms and creeds and professions, but in the daily life and conduct of its members, the love of Christ, is it a Church of Christ at all. Its outward and visible organization adapts itself to the requirements of successive ages. No Divine

plan has been laid down for its government. There is not the slightest warrant in Scripture, or even in the earliest extra-canonical writings, for saying, for instance, that a Church which has no Bishop is no Church of Christ at all. The ancient, venerable institution of the Episcopate, carries with it great authority, it has a *prima facie* claim to acceptance, for it is of great importance that we should secure continuity in the Church's life; no wise member of our own Church, I imagine, wishes to give it up; but I am quite persuaded that the existence of these baseless notions about the absolute necessity of episcopacy and the apostolical succession to a true Church are the greatest of all hindrances, both to present co-operation and at some future time to closer union between the divided members of Christ's Church. To get rid of these notions is the first step towards Christian re-union.

It is not only as a matter of practical necessity, for the edification of existing Christians and the preaching of Christ to the world, that the existence of the Church is necessary to Christianity. If we penetrate to the deepest meaning of the term, we shall find that the idea of the Church belongs to the very essence of the Christian ideal of life. What is the essence of that ideal? To treat all other men as brothers. And what was the Church in its origin? A band of brothers. And what does it mean to treat another man as a brother? Surely it means to treat every other man's good as no less important than one's own good; to promote his highest and truest good. And what is this *good* that Christians are to promote for others as for themselves? Certainly it includes their happiness in the common-sense meaning of the word. There is no trace in our Lord's teaching of contempt for ordinary human happiness; but happiness is not to the Christian the chief good of life. Certainly the cultivation of our highest faculties, the pursuit of knowledge, the enjoyment of beauty and intellectual development of all kinds are parts of the true good; but these things are not to the Christian the very highest good. If the highest attribute of God is love, then the highest element in true human good must also consist in love; and in the fullest sense, remember, two men are not brethren merely because one of them loves the other. The

love must be returned if they are to be in the truest and highest sense brothers one of another. The ideal of brotherhood can only be fully realized in a society.

We are, then, driven to this conclusion. The essence of the Christian's duty consists in trying to be himself a member, and to make others members, of a great society of men and women who love one another. That this is the very essence of the Christian ideal is set forth with extraordinary force and insight in a book entitled *The Problem of Christianity*, by the distinguished American philosopher, Josiah Royce, who died a few years ago. This one side of Christianity has never perhaps been presented so clearly and impressively. Unfortunately, the other side of the Christian life, communion with God as revealed in Christ, is almost entirely ignored; and much of the book, I am bound to say, is taken up with difficult, doubtful, and perhaps not very intelligible metaphysics of a very speculative order. So it is not a book that I would indiscriminately recommend to everyone. But the reason for which I have alluded to that work of Professor Royce is this. He makes a mistake that is often made in practice by much less philosophical persons. One might have supposed that, with such a conception of Christianity, nobody would appreciate better the importance of the Christian Church than Royce. Theoretically he does so, but in practice he ignores the Church or belittles it to almost nothing at all. He is quite right, no doubt, in pointing out that this brotherhood, this society of lovers, as he calls it, extends far beyond the limits of any one of the organized, visible, concrete corporations which are commonly called Churches. Every one of these societies is a very imperfect realization of the true ideal of the Church—a band of brothers in Christ. But then he draws from this fact what seems to me an entirely mistaken inference. So imperfectly do these organizations realise their high ideal that a man can be quite a good Christian without belonging to any of them or associating himself with any of their corporate activities. He may be just a Christian at large, completely isolated from other Christians except in the vague sense that he as an individual is trying to do what every other individual Christian is trying to do. In practice his advice is: You can sit as loosely as you like to each and every one of these

wretched sects. A system which began by placing the ideal of the Church in the forefront of its presentation of Christianity has ended in the most extreme individualism. It is just as if a man were first to exalt in magnificent terms the importance and authority of the State and then were to conclude that, inasmuch as all actual States are such very imperfect embodiments of the true ideal State as conceived by Plato or Aristotle or Hegel, the individual citizen is justified in completely ignoring the State, disowning its authority, disobeying its laws. Surely that would be a completely illogical attitude. A man must seek to realize his ideal of citizenship in some actual State, with all its imperfections. He must show himself a good citizen of the world by becoming a good member of his own actual State society.

Surely it is the same with the Church. No one of these jarring and conflicting organizations, or even all of them put together, actually is the Church. No one of them can be identified with that New Jerusalem which the Seer of Patmos beheld descending out of heaven as a bride adorned for her husband. But then we must remember that every one of them is an attempt to realize that magnificent ideal; and we shall show ourselves true members of the Church in the most ideal sense by becoming as good members as we can of the particular Christian society to which we belong. We shall, of course, not be blind to its imperfections, we shall try to reform it, to widen its membership, to purify its doctrines, to increase its efficiency, to promote that union with other Churches which is an essential part of the Church's ideal. But all experience shows that Churches can only be reformed from within; and no Church can become *the* Church until all Churches have overcome the defects to which the actual divisions of Christendom are due, and particularly that want of love which is the most conspicuous of those defects.

There has been much dispute about the question as to whether the Church is visible or invisible. The answer to that question is, I think: It is neither, or it is both. A Church that was wholly invisible, which consisted of isolated individuals not knowing or known to one another, not capable of being recognised by any outward mark or badge, never meeting together,

working together, or engaging in any corporate activities by which the life of any human society is manifested, would not be a Church at all. There is nothing that the enemies of the Church would desire more ardently than that the Church should be as invisible, as unrecognizable, as inconspicuous as possible. On the other hand, the moment you identify any outward and visible corporation, its members, its organizations, its hierarchy, its peculiar institutions and manner of life, with the Church; directly you say, 'No matter how far short that society falls of its true ideal, that society and that alone is the Church, the only Church'; the moment you say that, you are losing sight of all that makes the Church of Christ different from other human societies. The Church is neither invisible nor visible. It is an ideal. The true ideal of the Church is to be a society of all who love Christ and one another. The actual Church, any actual Church, may be, as the Westminster Confession well puts it, 'more or less visible'; and sometimes a particular Church may fall so far short of the ideal as to cease to be a Church of Christ at all; though we should all of us probably refuse to follow the Westminster Confession so far as to say that any Church has actually, as a matter of historical fact, become a synagogue of Satan. The true Church is an ideal, but it is an ideal which ought to be realized, which aims at being realized, which is more or less being realized by every actual Church; which is being more and more realized wherever there is a growth towards all that the Church was meant to be. The duty of each member of each particular Church is to help in making it more and more fit to be a representative, an embodiment, an incarnation of that ideal Church, that ideal band of brothers in Christ, which includes all branches of the actual Church, which exists in all those branches, and yet is more than each or all of them. 'Where love is, there is the Church.' The saying is true in a broader and deeper sense than Augustine intended. Love can be perfectly realized only in a society. Only in a society in which love exists in its perfection can the idea of the true Church be perfectly realized. The sooner any actual Church comes to that ideal the more it is a Church, a branch of the true Church; though no society can ever actually become the Church until it includes the whole body of those who love one another in Christ.

# SOME INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM*

By Canon Tollinton, D.D.

## I.

LIBERAL Christianity lacks a rigid religious scheme. Now, the Christian religion began as 'the Way.' It was a narrow way. It was narrow in the sense that all spiritual excellence, like excellence in art or in intellect, is high and hard and rare, and the few find it. But it was also narrow in the sense that it took to itself in increasing measure positive and defined rules of life. Certain things the Christian did; certain things he would not do. His beliefs gained precision. His creeds were largely drawn up to show him what he did not believe. He was more or less apart from the ordinary interests of life, and the one true charge among the many libellous scandals that were spread about him was that he was a bad citizen, guilty of incivism, indifferent to the *res publica*. But it was these narrow, persistent, often unattractive people who won the ancient world for the Cross. Their religious scheme was nothing if not definite. That it was so was at least the condition, if not the cause, of their astounding success. And to pass from ancient days to modern, some of us can remember in years now becoming remote that old Evangelical phase of piety, under which so many good men and women found their guidance towards the Kingdom of God. The familiar terms conversion, assurance, and the like; the quite definite plan of salvation which underlies so many of our still-used hymns; the devotional study of a Bible believed to be verbally inspired; the almost Puritan Sunday, or Sabbath as they called it—well, for many of us this is all gone or going, but it had a wonderful influence, ignoring many problems that cried aloud for attention, but yet forming a marked and truly spiritual feature of that Victorian era to which, in this our sombre day of disillusionment, some of us look back not without regret. This Evangelical piety also was a definite religious scheme. It could not have been effective without its defined characteristics. It was a way, with boundaries and fences.

*A paper read at a recent meeting of a Society of Clergy.

The like may be said of the Anglo-Catholic movement. English people, we have been recently reminded, have had a good look at this presentation of Christianity and have not accepted it. Elsewhere, of course, among peoples of a different racial temperament, Catholicism has been the medium of spiritual life to many millions, simple peasants some of them, some persons of education. Here, too, is a definite Scheme, the Mass, the Confessional, Ave Maria, the friendly Saints, the rosary—they are not ours, but they are all very definite, very concrete, very recognizable, elements in a religious scheme that had plain meaning for plain men and women. We Liberals have nothing that quite corresponds. Many ways, we believe, lead pilgrims to the Holy City, and human characters are so various that no definite rules can be laid down. Salvation for us is a process, of infinite variety, of long duration, not a state you can label and define. All life may be sacramental, so no sacrament has anything quite and peculiarly distinctive. The Bible is inspired; so were Shakespeare and Beethoven. The true Church is either in heaven, like the spiritual cities of Plato and St. John, or else in the hearts of men. Who of us would go back? Who of us would exchange all this wealth of the spirit for the precision and the limitation of other modes of religion? And yet truth may, as it were, be lost in its own universality. It needs form and embodiment if it is to find its way to the hearts of plain people. 'Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved.' 'Here under the form of bread and wine God is present upon the altar.' We miss the equivalent of such words as these, or if we use them it is with a different significance, which has not the same bite of immediate reality about it.

## II.

It is perhaps another aspect of the same distinction to say that religious Liberalism finds little delight in antitheses. Some years ago I recollect an article of Edward Caird's in the *Hibbert Journal*, in which he drew a distinction between two types of mentality, the one possessed of a ready eye for contrasts, the other equally ready to notice affinities. Paul, Aeschylus, Luther, were the instances given of men who regarded the world as a panorama of antitheses; Plato, Shakespeare, Goethe, if I remember right, were given as instances of the other type.

It might of course be said that Hegel, with his famous three stages of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, had provided a scheme which found place for both, but for practical purposes it is probably true that our minds work by the one method or the other; this man notices distinction, this other affinity. In most of our ordinary thinking we make large use of contrasts. We cannot know that one thing is good without knowing that its opposite is evil. All positive advance implies a corresponding negation. The average English mind is peculiarly addicted to antithesis. From Waterloo to the Great War, French and English was a most satisfying contrast. To-day the League of Nations leaves the man in the street puzzled: he wants an opposite and you suggest inclusion. Temperamentally, according to all his instincts as a natural man, he is unfitted for it. In politics he is no lover of coalitions. To a ministry of all the talents he prefers two alternating governments, each possessed only of half, but working more effectively through opposition. Consider how deeply this feature is impressed upon religion. St. John rushing from the bath in which he met Cerinthus; Athanasius *contra mundum*; Luther achieving, possibly achieving too much, where Erasmus left things apparently as they were—these are the spirits who can elicit enthusiasm, because they are prepared without reservation to give an absolute challenge to the foe. Contrast the hideous vitality which distinctions of so-called religion, Catholic and Protestant, have recently displayed in Ireland with the very tepid desire the average Churchman or Congregationalist has for re-union amongst ourselves. It is easier to secure a large collection for a missionary society by describing the evil practices of the heathen world, than it is to induce even intelligent people to give a fair and unprejudiced study to Buddhism. And I have heard it sarcastically said that an English Churchman may or may not be proud of the Church of his baptism, but at any rate he thanks God that he is not a Nonconformist. Now there is much in this temper that, to his credit, is abhorrent to the genuine Liberal in religion. He loves synthesis rather than contrast. Like Plato's philosopher he is 'synoptic,' quick to see affinities; if he may not attain to being 'the spectator of all time and of all existence,' at least he recognizes the great dignity of those exalted points of view. So, in the phrase of the

old master, he rejoices that many streams flow into the river of truth. He would see God in everything and everything in God. He does not insist on the contrasts of heaven and hell, of sheep and goats, of saved and lost. He loves to recognize a Christian sentiment in a non-Christian writer. For him, at any rate, other religions have their elements of value. There is something very gracious about this type of piety at its best; for that reason, perhaps, it is beloved of the poets:

> 'This our life . . .
> Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
> Sermons in stones and good in everything.'

Or again, with Tennyson:

> 'His faith hath centre everywhere,
> Nor cares to fix itself in form.'

There is something admirable in this generous welcome accorded to all affinity. We had rather have Erasmus than Luther as our guest. Yet I have called this feature in religious Liberalism a difficulty. At any rate, it involves a difficulty. It is the paradox of Pantheism that it leaves God nothing to do because God does everything. Similar is the problem raised when we ask: Can sweet reasonableness be aggressive? And that is my second difficulty.

## III.

I now come to something of a different character. Religious Liberalism is liable to be involved in issues which are properly social or political: it is so far prevented from doing its own work on the distinctively religious plane. I recollect once hearing Bishop Gore say that it was a hopeless matter to invite attention to religious subjects until the social question had first been dealt with. I quote the remark to show that the Bishop recognized that the two questions are distinct. It is like the account of the man in the Gospels who, having brought his gift to the altar, was told to put it down and go and be reconciled with his brother and then return to offer his gift. It is of course a truism that a man's action in regard to social, economic, political issues will be determined by higher motives, will aim at nobler ends, will be more disinterested, more considerate, more courageous, in proportion as he is a really religious man. But liberal characteristics in his religion do not imply or necessi-

tate any particular attitude in questions of the social order. You may imagine a man who has very little faith in democracy as a form of government, who regards the closing down of large country houses as a real loss to the nation, who thinks the competitive and capitalistic system, with all its obvious abuses, has on the whole done more good than harm, and who yet in religion has the wide views, the fairness of mind, the love of light and truth, the freedom from prejudice and partisan temper which are among the best qualities of the liberal spirit. The man who thinks the Book of Daniel was written in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes does not necessarily desire that the State should manage the railways in the days of George V. Even in the matter of marriage and divorce, where religious and social issues are as closely related as anywhere, we may recognize the incomparable value of the Christian ideal while advising, as a practical measure, such State regulations as the existing social conditions render most expedient for the community as a whole. Closely as the religious and the social issues are here related, they are not identical. And if you may have a High Church Socialist, why not a Broad Church Die-hard? No one who has eyes to see would question the importance for the world's future of the social and economic problems of the age. No one would doubt the duty that lies upon every Christian man and woman to contribute according to their powers towards social welfare. Admittedly it would be difficult to distinguish the religious and the social elements in, say, Charles Kingsley. Nevertheless, one resents the exploitation of religious Liberalism for political ends. There is much in a name, and one welcomes the growing use of the term 'Modernist,' because it relieves us of the use of such labels as 'Liberal' and 'Conservative' in regard to religion, with all their inevitable connotation and suggestion of a political significance. A sturdy farmer, half Nonconformist, half Churchman, remarked to me the other day that he was glad to contribute to Church funds because he thought the Church was such a useful bulwark against Bolshevism. That is an instance of similar confusion on the opposite side. Liberal Christianity would be relieved of a considerable difficulty and impediment if the religious issue could be kept distinct.

## IV.

As against the contention of the last section of my paper, I can imagine that some of us would be prepared to assert that the association of religious Liberalism with certain views on social, economic and political issues has been not accidental, but due to inherent affinity. Such association I am prepared to admit in regard to the next point of this paper, namely, the relation of religious Liberalism to philosophy. The wide view does tend to be the philosophic view, for the simple reason that it is philosophy that endeavours to take account of all the facts. As concrete result you find that religious Liberals tend to be an intellectual minority within the Church. It is due to the existence of such a school of thought that, as the Dean of St. Paul's has said, it is possible to-day for an educated man to be a clergyman. And let us say at once that if Christianity had no place for the intellect, if we could only preserve it by holding it apart from all those great ultimate questions with which it is the province of philosophy to deal—well, it would be difficult for some of us to call ourselves Christians. We should in effect be asked to admit that the love of the mind for God was only a minor and tolerable virtue. In the trinity of ultimate values—Goodness, Truth and Beauty—we should be asked to allow a subordination of Truth to Goodness far outpassing the subordination which Arius once wished to establish between the Son and the Father. Those who are not prepared for these admissions will continue to value such books as John Caird's *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity* and to support the claim, first explicitly made in the lecture-rooms of Alexandria by Clement, and to a less extent by Origen, that there is the most intimate connection between philosophy and religion. Plato has said that the multitude have no philosophy, *φιλόσοφον πλῆθος ἀδύνατον*, and it was certainly not as a philosopher that the Jesus of history appealed to the listening crowds among the villages of Galilee. When the demands of the stomach and the pocket are satisfied, in nine cases out of ten it is from the heart, not from the head, that the next demand arises: 'out of the heart are the issues of life.' Hence come such assertions as that the intellect has produced nothing of religious value. Goethe said without qualification that Christianity had nothing

to do with philosophy, and maintained that thought, while it widened, also lamed. The same kind of view recurs in Bishop Gore's recent *Belief in God*, with its extraordinary depreciation of the spiritual contribution of the philosophers. The indifference of the clergy of the Church of England to the great ultimate issues with which human life presents us, not on the plane of action but on that of thought, is colossal; I recall the blank astonishment with which a friend once spoke of it, who came from a more philosophic country north of the Tweed. In this respect intellectual Liberalism is rather maintaining a disregarded principle than meeting any general demand. No doubt to do so is laudable service, always provided we can keep some sort of balance between heart and head. Some measure of active service, some frequent contact with simple persons who do not read, should be the complement of thought and study. For with some of us probably the danger is to be aloof and apart from the crowd, to give way to impatience, if not to the Pharisees' scorn of 'this people which knoweth not the law,' perhaps growing weary as we grow older of the petty issues on which such a mass of effort and contention is daily expended, and so coming to wrap ourselves in the philosopher's—not the prophet's—mantle of a cynicism which is not unkindly, and which accords with Horace Walpole's dictum that life is a comedy to those who think. Perhaps the danger is mainly temperamental, a matter of individual character rather than one of religious outlook. But I think it is to some extent emphasised by those inherent qualities of religious Liberalism which often draw it in the direction of thought rather than of action.

## V.

I pass on to enquire how far it is true that Liberalism in religion tends to be morally 'easy going,' fails to be sufficiently exacting in its spiritual demands. 'There is nothing,' said Lord Morley in his *Compromise*, 'like a roaring trade for engendering latitudinarians.' Your Broad Churchman, it is said, is always deficient in his sense of sin. Whatever Liberalism gives us, it produces no ascetics and no martyrs. 'When we tire of the saints, Shakespeare is our city of refuge.' Was it not Carlyle who expressed the fear that Socrates would have been terribly at ease in Zion? Such is the charge: we are sufficiently

familiar with it. Nor will it be quite an adequate answer to point out that Thomas Arnold, great Erastian as he was, had a marked vein of austere spirituality in his nature, or to say that, on the other hand, the Clapham Evangelicals, though they thought the theatre wicked, could appreciate good dinners and old port wine. You may add that the very pleasant and very worldly clerics of Trollope's Barchester were rendered easy going rather by their comfortable orthodoxy than by any taint of liberal views. But such instances are hardly conclusive: they are too conflicting and even contradictory. On the whole I would be prepared to admit that broad views do lead towards toleration and that toleration is no absolute virtue; it all depends what we tolerate. Through our Liberalism we may lose the finer perception of spiritual distinctions, and the refusal to shun and forsake the world may eventually leave a man not only in it, but also wholly of it. I am not sure how far it is desirable to revive, were it possible, the old-fashioned sense of sin. Some natures there certainly are to which the Gospel of Service appeals with a force which the Gospel of Salvation does not possess. We are hardly likely in these days to live on a pillar like Simon Stylites, or to wear a hair shirt like Pusey. But a Christianity so liberal that it has no place for a Cross and no use to make of sacrifice is likely to live and move on the levels of spiritual mediocrity; not there shall we find inspiration, not there shall we discover any vision of the Kingdom of God. Just because he cannot find much value in many of the restrictions and denials which other schools of religious life make of so great account, all the more is the Liberal Christian wise if he keeps his standard of duty clear and high, and if he refuses to dissolve the mystic austerity of conscience into the trivialities of casuistry and debate. I am not at all sure that I want to see religious Liberalism popular. Prosperity would almost inevitably corrupt it. As things are, if we cannot find spiritual gain in fasting, or feel any and every form of self-surrender good, at least in some minor measure we may suffer for the truth's sake. No one, as it was recently observed, becomes a Modernist for the sake of ecclesiastical promotion. We are not called upon to be cranks and, personally, I have a sort of constitutional impatience of all extremists. Yet a man in holy orders who has suffered isolation or missed

promotion or been treated by his neighbours with suspicion because he has held opinions which are not popular, has made his sacrifice and merited his recognition, all the more worthy of honour just because it is so very easy to find a comfortable principle of accommodation in the Liberal creed. When the man in the street says such an one is a person of broad views, he usually means that he sees no very marked or sharp distinction between right and wrong.

VI.

Finally, religious Liberalism does not lend itself to organization. You can form associations for definite purposes, for opposing marriage with a deceased wife's sister or for promoting Christian knowledge. But the purposes of religious Liberalism are not definite. They cannot be embodied in a Churchmen's Union so fully as other well-known aims are embodied in the English Church Union. And better so, we may add, from one standpoint; from another, loss and difficulty are thereby involved. For properly, and at its best, religious Liberalism is a spirit, a temper, an attitude of mind, a force that works at sundry times and in divers manners, achieving here a little and there a little, a diffused influence, not—*pace* Dr. Harris—a compacted system; it is subtle, elusive, intermittent, found often in unexpected quarters and operative sometimes in strange associations. It is so happiest when it is free from organisation, for organization means limitation. There is a well-known saying that ideas create institutions and then institutions crush ideas. Art is more than academies, and Christ is more than the Church. Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. We might be content with something as wide and universalistic as that noble dictum of St. Paul. But we are on earth, not yet in heaven. In particular we are in and of the Church of England, and in the Church of England are committees and newspapers and parish funds and a National Assembly, and Upper Houses of Convocation and very much lower houses as well. Let all this machinery, it is said, work on as it will—it is mere organization, let it be. But the consequence is practical loss and missed opportunity. There was method, I think, and some organization in the Lord's training of the twelve. Possibly Paul had the organization of the Roman Empire in view in the planning of his missionary journeys. Certainly, if Mr. Raven is right in his opti-

mistic belief that, 'given adequate support, the Churchmen's Union could dominate the Church within the next ten years,' that result will not come about without very wise and systematic arrangement. To have such an opportunity and to fail for want of coherence and hard labour over detail to make use of it would only give meaning to the taunt that we are the 'sterile' party in the Church. Whether or no graver practical responsibilities lie before us and our friends of the rising generation, the mere possibility of this should induce us to take as full a share as is open to us in all the routine of the Church's organization and not less to contribute, as we may have opportunity, to the closer association and practical co-operation of all who share our aims. The society is not the spirit, but the spirit works through societies and that implies organization. Perhaps it is not always the most attractive methods that are most effective in promoting the cause of the Kingdom of God.

I have now described six inherent difficulties of religious Liberalism, and such I believe them to be. But let me add that I hold in each case that the difficulty is mainly the counterpart of a more than compensating asset and advantage. We—call us Liberals, Modernists, Broad Churchmen, what you will, we have never yet been given a quite satisfactory name—have to-day a position within the Church better assured and more fully recognized than it has ever been since the days of Kingsley and Maurice. I desire to express my belief that for this, during the last few months, we have been immensely indebted to the fairness of mind, the Christian sanity, and the wise judgment of Randall Thomas, Primate of all England, and surely filling his office by the grace of God. With such an open door of opportunity before us, we shall be wise to realize the risks of the way. It will be cause for regret, and in some degree it will affect the future of the Church of England, if either for want of a clear message, or through love of ineffective generalities—if through too close an alliance either with social and political movements, or with the remote intellectualism of philosophy—if either through spiritual slackness or through indifference to practical details in a practical world, we fail to render to Church and Fatherland such a measure of religious service as we perhaps under God can give and they so unquestionably need.

# CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE*

*Genesis*, i, 1: 'In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth'; and *I Peter* i, 20: 'Christ, who was foreknown indeed before the foundation of the world, but was manifested at the end of the times for your sake.'

We have been reading in Chapel this term Old Testament lessons, telling the story of the Creation, of the Fall, of the Flood, of the Call of Abraham, and the selection of the Jews as the people of God; in the course of the week science and history are studied in such a way that you must of necessity acquire a very different outlook on the past from which we have come. I want to show you, if I can, that there is no conflict between the new knowledge and the old religion, though conflict arises as soon as either of them is misconceived: rightly understood each brings enrichment to the other, and ennobles our life on earth. And I have chosen two texts, one from the opening of the Bible and one from the end, because rightly understood they reveal the great truth to which both religion and science seem to me to bear abundant witness.

You must take care to be right in your attitude to the Bible, and I say this at the outset because many of us in this country inherit a tradition by which our religion is made for us by the Bible, and is unrelated to the rest of our knowledge. But religion is not made by the Bible; the truth is that the Bible was made by religion, it is the supreme expression of the religious experience of the past. But the experience widens and deepens, as knowledge grows; Christ sets our faces towards the future. We must give to the Old Testament, the book of the past, its place, its very great place, but not more than its place.

What do I mean by religion when I say that religion made the Bible? I mean by religion that man in all times and places that we know has had a sense of a Power which expresses itself in the Universe, and has felt a need to bring himself into relation to that Power. Religion is a sense of an Unseen Power, and a need thereof. Of that sense and of that need the book of Genesis is one expression, of wonderful vision, and in certain

*A sermon preached in Marlborough College Chapel by Dr. Cyril Norwood, Master of Marlborough College.

ways of still enduring value; but it is fatal to take it for something other than which it is.

I say fatal because to take it as history sets your religion at issue with knowledge. Let me tell you in what sort of view I was brought up, or rather which I absorbed from my bringing up, a view which subsequent reading and thought have greatly modified. I was taught to believe that man was created of a fixed type, fully developed, and very much like what you and I feel ourselves to be; that he has had a history on this earth of quite limited duration in time; that he fell from a state of primitive innocence; that he thus a little more than 1900 years ago provided the occasion for God to show His love in the sacrifice of Christ. Now this not only bristles with difficulties in itself, but it is in some parts directly contrary to knowledge. Moreover it is not a view which I can find either in the words of Our Lord or in the great New Testament writers. I believe the truth to be that man in a form distinctly recognisable as human has been on this earth for probably half a million years, making with many a set-back slow upward progress, and that previous to these years there have been long stages of animal history with which he is not unconnected; during all this vast space of time man has been growing very slowly in his knowledge and likeness to God; and in the fullness of time, that is, at the right time there came one, even Jesus Christ, in Whom men saw that God dwelt, through Whom alone they can grow liker to God, Who is indeed the Way, the Truth and the Life. And now you will see why I chose two texts. I want to start from God Who in the beginning created the heavens and the earth, and I want to bring you in the light of modern knowledge and science to Christ, 'Who was foreknown indeed before the foundation of the world, but was manifested at the end of the times for your sake.' I would have you free of tradition and formalism; I would have you get back behind presuppositions and the 'dead hand' to the living gospel that Christ taught.

What do the modern physicist and biologist say? As I read their books, I feel that in their view Creation is an eternal process, an eternal state of becoming, never finished, in which no stage is ever repeated. And God is not wholly external to the Universe, wholly outside. He did not make it like a mechanical

toy, and set it in motion, and sit down to watch it. God is in the Universe, creating, sustaining, dissolving, re-creating. The modern physicist tells you that matter is simply a more or less stable form of energy; he resolves the atom into electrons, and traces everything back at last to the ether and an operation of energy taking place therein. Of necessity he stops there at the limits of his science, but may we not find the source of that energy in the exercise of the Divine Will?

[1]If we call the chemist also into consultation, he tells us that the whole inorganic world is specially fitted to become the basis of life, and that water and carbonic acid, the things which more than anything else make the world about us what it is, serve better than anything else could do to make lasting and stable and complex both all living things themselves and the world around them. And therefore, so far as can be traced, the process of evolution has been this, to make the inorganic world a fit environment, a fit basis, for life, and at the right time, in the fullness of time, life has appeared, at first in the very lowliest and humblest forms. And that life gradually develops to higher manifestations, being always something which just because it is life does not lose energy like everything else round it which has not got life, but which continually resists, regulates itself, maintains itself, reproduces itself, developing at last into something which carries its past about with it in the form of memory, and is able in the light of that past to change and modify its present. And at the last, at long last, man appears. Isaiah was not so far wrong, even when tried by the standard of the latest scientific thought, when he said:

> 'Thus saith the Lord that createth the heavens: he is God: that formed the earth, and made it: he established it not a waste, he formed it to be inhabited.'

It is sometimes said that the Bible, like other books of religion, is wrong in being too anthropocentric—a long word which only means that man regards himself as having been created, so to speak, ready-made with all the world outside him created ready-made for his use. That is crude, but not altogether

[1] See Professor J. Y. Simpson's *Man and the Attainment of Immortality*, where this argument is much more fully worked out, and of which part of this sermon is an abstract.

wrong; for if you think of all that measureless duration of time which went to form the inorganic world into a world in which life was possible, and again all that measureless duration of time during which life developed from its most primitive beginnings, and finally if you think of the long process of the emergence of man, does it not seem reasonable to suppose that something of very real value was being developed? In all that half million years which we can see more clearly than the preceding time man, as the great operations of creation develop, has been the growing point, as it were, of the whole process. And in all that process and movement God was becoming man. In Jesus Christ God became man.

Do I make clear to you how the whole process shapes itself to my thought? God, the Divine Spirit, Love, just because He is Love, realizes Himself in the Universe through processes which to us finite creatures seem of infinite duration; He creates life, living creatures, and under His plastic stress they grow more and more complex; human beings appear and these too grow, grow spiritually, and become more and more able to become the dwelling-place of the Holy Spirit. May it not be that at the last there shall appear free spiritual beings capable of coming into full union and fellowship with the Divine? But in the meantime, as St. Paul says 'when the fullness of time came, God sent forth His Son, born of a woman.'

You may ask me, should not this mark the end of the process, should not it come rather as the grand climax? Why should it have occurred just precisely some 1900 odd years ago? Let me repeat to you again some of the words of my second text 'manifested at the end of the times for your sake.' He came when the world was ready for Him, and because the world was ready for Him, at the end of the times, the end of a stage, and He came for your sake, because without Him advance further was not possible. He came to be the Way and the Life. Compare yourselves with all else that lives in the creation; in all other living creatures, plants and animals, you see the species changed and transformed by environment. But in human evolution you see character transformed by its own ideal. You are drawn upward and on by the force of ideals. And therefore, while the perfect plant can only appear at the end of the process, the

ideals which are to shape and direct the growth of man must come somehow and at some time while man is growing. Christ is the ideal; in Him God became man; He became man for your sake, because only by following Him will man follow his true evolution, and become more like unto God.

When St. Paul in his *Epistle to the Colossians* writes that Christ 'is before all things, and in Him all things consist,' he is not writing cloudy mysticism, but words that have a definite meaning and throw a flood of light on the whole course of Creation. That process is a whole; it is not a dance of fortuitous atoms; chance does not rule. From the beginning it has had an end set before it, that we may become sons of God; and so it has always meant Jesus Christ, foreknown in the Creative Divine Mind before the foundation of the world.

Since God became man, a moment only has elapsed as compared with the vast space of evolutionary time that has gone before. Who shall set bounds to what lies in front? Christ is given us, the Way, the Truth, the Life. If we follow, we grow; if we refuse, we shall be thrown aside, even as 'in the dark backward and abysm of time' that lies behind us countless types and forms of life have been discarded. Nature never returns on herself, nor does God give second chances to unfaithful civilizations. But through Christ we walk in hope; we see through a glass darkly, but we see something; we are not wholly blind. To us it is given to know the mystery which hath been hid from ages and generations, but now, as St. Paul claims 'is made manifest to his saints.'

Now in this light we can understand why Christ said both that the Father is greater than I, and that I and the Father are one. Christ is God brought so near to men that they can hear and see him, that God to whom the spirit of Emily Bronte cried with the vision granted by oncoming death of the body

> With wide-embracing love
> Thy spirit animates eternal years,
> Pervades and broods above,
> Changes, sustains, dissolves, creates, and rears.
>
> There is not room for death,
> Nor atom that his might could render void:
> Thou, Thou art Being and Breath,
> And what Thou art may never be destroyed.

You who learn here to begin to use the critical historic method, do not use it merely to analyse, to weigh opposites, and to suspend judgement. Be sure that life has a meaning, and you will lose the best if you do not search it out. You who begin to study science in its more advanced forms, do not lose yourselves in detail, or think that the whole of reality is within the limits of your subject-matter. In that subject-matter is the infinitesimally small, and the infinitely great; the scientist can resolve the atom, and raise his eyes to the contemplation of the solar system, and systems beyond the sun. And yet the meaning of all is within you, within your own hearts; the eternal values are within your own souls. Do you remember those lines of Francis Thompson?

Not where the wheeling systems darken,
And our benumbed conceiving soars!
The drift of pinions, would we hearken,
Beats at our own clay-shuttered doors.
The angels keep their ancient places;—
Turn but a stone, and start a wing!
'Tis ye, 'tis your estranged faces
That miss the many-splendoured thing.

# BOOK REVIEWS

## ORTHODOX DUALISM.*

Professor Pringle Pattison's most interesting book opens with the impressive fact that palaeolithic man laid away his dead with symbols of his belief in an after-life. Primitive man is distinguished from the animals as much by his immortal hope as by the shape of his thumbs or his use of tools. The animism of primitive man—an inheritance from pre-historic millenniums—became a secondary instinct. As such it has always, will always, prompt man to speculation, critical enquiry and rational theory.

The first reflection on the subject seems to have been prompted by observing that injury to the body impaired the mind. Surely, then, the mind must die with the body, and what survived must be a colourless shade? Thus the happy hunting grounds or sensuous heaven of an earlier race gave place to a dark region of senseless ghosts. Hence we see that what man can believe concerning the life after death depends on what he believes the *soul* or *self* to be. This book might have been entitled, 'The idea of the soul, its origin and destiny.' It contains but ten extraordinarily lucid and interesting chapters, which outline the world's thought on this subject.

Primitive animism, being, like modern spiritualism, a doctrine of mere continuance under earthly conditions, 'leads nowhere because it has no

* *The Idea of Immortality*, by Professor A. S. Pringle Pattison. Clarendon Press, price 12/6 net.

*Liberalism, Modernism and Tradition*, by Canon O. C. Quick. Longmans; price 7/6 net.

moral or religious value. This is strikingly exemplified in the popular beliefs both of the Greeks and of the Hebrews—and, it may be added, of the Romans. To these three nations we owe nearly all the elements of our European civilization; yet in none of them, during the longest and most brilliant period of their history, did popular or traditional belief about the soul advance beyond the stage of "primitive animism"' (p. 14).

We are all accustomed to hear how, with the Hebrews, the idea of personal immortality only became active with the collapse of national prosperity, when the Jew became conscious of the need of that personal relation to his God which would outlast the storm of life. With this came the conviction that Jehovah could not consign His lovers to the living death of Sheol. The self or soul was reinstated in the vision of an after-life; but the attainment of bliss in that after-life became an ethical achievement. Our author shows how Greek thought on this subject became moralized in the same way. A parallel is drawn between the Homeric Hades and the Hebrew Sheol. Sheol is a land 'where the light is as darkness' (*Job* x, 22). The shades are incapable of praise or hope (*Isa.* xxxviii, 18—19). The Homeric dead 'flock together, "like bats" we are told, with a strange twittering or gibbering noise, incapable either of bliss or woe' (p. 20). In both Hades and Sheol what survived death was an immaterial substance that was a mere focus of negations. This conception of spirit is of great importance in its after influence on Western thought. It was held long enough to cut deeply into the mind of the race, and turned up later in the idea of God, but, as a description of the soul, it had to be discarded when the religion of a thinking people deepened under national misfortune. The downfall of the Greek city states was followed by religious awakening. How can man, subject to national and domestic destruction, find a safe home in the universe? In the thought of Homeric Greece to be mortal was to be subject to destruction. How, then, obtain immortality? The Phrygio--Thracian cult of Dionysus brought the first hope of union with an immortal God as a method of realizing a life that was not subject to earthly misfortune. 'There is general agreement among scholars and anthropologists that just in this wild "enthusiasm" or possession by the god, this ecstasy, in which the individual seems to pass out of himself and feel himself one with the gods whose rites he is celebrating, lay the germ of a new conception of the soul and its destiny' (p. 23). Again, 'Orphism adopts what we have found to be the fundamental idea of the Dionysiac enthusiasts, and draws conclusions from it which have profoundedly influenced subsequent philosophy and religion. Here, as in the case of the Hebrews, when the idea of immortality in any living sense, emerges, it is based on a unique experience . . . The blessed life hereafter is the consequence or continuation of a communion with the god which the worshipper has already enjoyed' (p. 25). The Orphic presupposition was that that which is capable of union with a god must itself be of divine origin. Plato reverses the dualistic conception of the Homeric Hades, in which the soul was a pale reflection of the real bodily self. With him the body is but the imperfect image of the soul. In this he maintains the animistic belief that the soul is separable from the body and only related to it as an inmate to a house. The soul is of divine origin and pre-existent. In the *Phaedo* we read, 'The true philosopher is, in every respect, at enmity with the body.' His struggle is to 'live pure from the body, to have no communication or intercourse with it beyond what is absolutely necessary' (p. 59).

'The Orphic-Platonic doctrine of the Soul resembles a presupposition on Plato's part, rather than the result of his own psychological analysis

or of any independent scientific investigation into the actual relation of soul and body. There is in fact, according to this doctrine, no real relation between them: they are treated as two separate and independent entities. The pre-existent soul "cometh from afar" to be the tenant of a particular body, and any soul may inhabit any body. The belief in the transmigration of a human soul (*i.e.* of a soul that had been united with a human body) into the body of one of the lower animals places this beyond doubt. But, even if we limit the idea of transmigration to the passage of human souls into other human bodies, the soul is in each case only the temporary inmate or tenant of the particular body. Soul and body belong to two different worlds; and, although the soul is no doubt conceived as conditioned for the time by the nature of its dwelling-house (being dependent on so many avenues of sensation for its knowledge, and so forth), and also as liable to contamination from the desires which have their seat in the body, it is still in its intrinsic nature a creature of another sphere. This dualism is fundamental in Plato's theory, and from him it passed into the orthodox Christian tradition' (p. 62).

We are here met by the arresting question whether this Orphic dualism gives us any satisfactory account of life.

Aristotle sought to discover the nature of the soul from observation of the living organism. He treats conscious experience as the final form of what is seen of the ascending scale of biological evolution. The vegetable life of growth and nutrition, the animal life of movement and feeling, combine with the rational life, which is the highest function of life, the final expression of biological fact. The natural living body is the unit under investigation. Body and soul are the two correlative terms by which we express the mode of its existence. 'Body and soul are thus not two separate entities; still less can any soul inhabit every body. Each soul is the soul of such and such a body, and each body the seed-plot of such and such a soul. And, according to Aristotle's dominant mood and his usual form of statement, the idea of a disembodied or discarnate soul seems almost a contradiction in terms' (p. 65). The self is thus inseparable from the body and dies with it. Here the doctrine of the *nous* or pure reason comes in to supply the demand of the inherited instinct for a transcendental life. But Aristotle's *nous,* which is manifested in the highest activities of the soul, is impersonal and impassive. It is imperishable, but the individual self perishes. This is no doctrine of personal immortality, but our author believes that Aristotle, approaching the question of the nature of the soul as a scientific observer, came nearer than Plato to a true theory of known facts. He failed to arrive at a belief in personal immortality, not because his grasp of the evolutionary process was not sound, but because in his world of thought what is immortal or divine has no relation to what is natural, except perhaps the relation of being able to intrude temporarily upon the natural. Pure reason which feeds upon truths that are eternal was held to be of a different substance from animal intelligence. He was not in a position to perceive that animal intelligence passes by infinite gradations from the lowest life to the highest intellectual power and a grasp of the highest values.

Aristotle's doctrine of the impersonal divine reason which visited the soul was grafted into Christian dogmatic, and, by loose interpretation, made to harmonize with Plato's doctrine of two entities. The *Nous* became the divinely created human mind which entered each body when the individual life began, and, being of God, was of separate nature from the body.

Thus Western religious and philosophic thought has had to cope always with the presupposition that nature was a closed system, of a substance and character different from anything that could be thought of as immortal or divine. This dualism creates an insoluble problem—the question of how we may think of two kinds of being in one living whole. Obviously to the simple, more obviously to the scientific investigator, man, a living organism, is one, not two things. But the crude materialism which rejects immortality, holding consciousness to be only a temporal accident of the physical system, is no explanation of man, because it offers no explanation of what is most characteristic of his life, seeing that 'no vital process whatever, however simple and, at first sight, purely physical it might seem, admits of adequate statement in merely physical terms' (p. 90-1).

From this dualism of spirit and a merely physical body we get the theories of interaction, parallelism and epiphenomenalism and their different modifications down to the modern recrudescence of animism. In a lucid survey the history of these terms is briefly recalled; the analysis of Lotze's view is most interesting. Their futility to explain the facts of life is obvious. Human life is not susceptible of explanation either by the rejection of a spiritual world to which the soul belongs, or on the supposition that the natural order is different in origin and essence from the supernatural order. 'In spite of the decisive significance which attaches to the emergence of the conceptual reason—a significance which I have repeatedly emphasized—there is no occasion to contest the conclusion suggested by the scientific history of the globe and of the race, that man attained this faculty by infinitely gradual steps . . . As for the churchly doctrine of a rational soul implanted in each individual organism, by all means let us think of the individual life-history, no less than of the cosmic development, as a divinely directed process, to which, in view of its issue, no fitter word than creation can be applied. But do not let us imagine a divine figure standing by to inject a bit of supernatural stuff into the bodily mixture at the appropriate moment. The soul is no insulated supernatural being, infused into certain extraneous material conditions, but should be recognized as the natural, though not the less divinely ordained, outcome of these conditions themselves' (pp. 71-72).

But if the soul be one with the universe—the culminating fruit of man's universe, what of the universe? Whence comes life, with its power to create vegetable and animal beauty, its power to bring forth intelligence and love even in the highest forms in which these are known to us—in speculative faith and aspiration? Concerning the whence and whither of the soul as we know it, we are shown that until a good immortal life was thought of as an achievement, ethical life made no progress. Although future life was only at first thought to be attained by some non-ethical practice, yet the mere thought of a future division of mankind into saved and unsaved caused men quickly to consign to perdition those who injured them. Hence to avoid doing injury would become a condition of future salvation, and ethical analysis and definition of the right and the good would follow.

We have no space even to suggest the value of Professor Pringle Pattison's discussion of ethical and religious beliefs brought into being by the fear of perdition and hope of further salvation. The doctrines of pre-existence, transmigration, karma, depend on the dual conception of mind and body. They fall short of any realization of the value of personality which is the basis of the best ethical development. The same may be said of the doctrine of Nirvana, or any doctrine of absorption in the source of

life. The noblest ideas of God and duty come in the line of thought that finds in our highest conception of human personality the only approach to the Real and Eternal. The belief that the personal soul comes in the line of biological development points to the fact that the universe must be judged by its final product and that that product the soul, takes form from the supreme Reality. 'Truth, Beauty, Goodness have no reality as self-existent abstractions; they have no meaning apart from conscious experience. They carry us therefore to a primal Mind in whose experience they are eternally realized. God himself is at once the supreme Reality and, as Dante calls him, the supreme Value. The highest conception we can form of perfect personality is Love, not in any shallow sentimental sense, but the self-giving Love which expends itself for others, and lives in all their joys and sorrows. Such love, then, the principle of our argument bids us take as the ultimate value of which the universe is the manifestation. It bids us conceive the inmost being of God not solely as the realization of eternal Truth and the enjoyment of perfect Beauty, but pre-eminently as the exercise and fruition of his nature as Love. And if so, the value of the finite world to the Spirit of the universe must lie, above all else, if one may so speak with modesty and reverence, in the spirits to whom he has given the capacity to make themselves in His own image' (p. 190).

This, of course, is but a slight sketch of one line of thought in a book full of interesting analysis and original observation. The ordinary preacher who has read philosophy either long ago or in a desultory way can find in this book a disentanglement and elucidation of his own vague reminiscences of the world's speculation concerning the nature and destiny of the soul. The book seems to us also of special practical value at this time because the ordinary Christian teacher needs the education it gives in order to combat effectively the teachings of Spiritualism by offering a positive and rational doctrine of the next life.

In Canon Quick's Paddock Lectures we pursue, under a different aspect, the same theme of an age-long dualism which, while it creates insoluble problems, no longer convinces a doubting world of the truth it was created to defend. Canon Quick's work is characterized by a combination of mental power, honesty, and sympathy which is as rare as it is valuable to the life of the Church.

It is very true that to state a problem correctly is to go far towards solving it. Canon Quick's statement of the problem of Christology in modern thought is a real contribution to theological discussion. It may be briefly summarized.

Orthodoxy upholds the transcendent Reality of God by assuming the two worlds of neo-Platonic dualism—the opposition of God to the world, of soul to body; and insists upon the combination of deity and humanity as two distinct natures in Jesus Christ. Canon Quick finds that the doctrine of the two natures, as defined at Chalcedon, is only a form or mould for Christology. It asserts the union, interpenetration, and distinction of the natures in Christ; but the dogma itself 'must remain a mere form, deriving its content from the positive conceptions of Deity and humanity which men put into it' (p. 101).

Jewish thought conceived of the opposition between God and man as holiness opposed to unholiness—God, a Holy Being who could in no wise be defiled by taint or corruption or death, was remote from man, essentially unholy and corrupt. Christ, as seen in the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, is holy, and therefore the manifestation of God. But God as Saviour must partake of human nature in order to impart the Divine nature to those who by faith

become his brethren. For him death was not a mortal defilement, but a divine sacrifice whereby humanity had access to divine holiness.

The Greeks thought of Deity as the changeless reality behind the world of change. God was self-existent, impassible, immutable. It was impossible that God should suffer or die. Common Greek speculation had it that in every human soul there was a spark of what was divine and therefore imperishable; but this spark was impassible and separable from the conscious self. Therefore the Greek Fathers, asserting the two natures in Christ, conceived of each as separate from the other.

A great change came when modern philosophy ceased to represent God negatively as being or substance that had no share in concrete life. God came to be thought of, not as the object of knowledge, but as universal intelligence interpenetrating human understanding. Modern philosophy is thus liable to lose sight of the distinction between Deity and humanity which is essential to the religion of Christ because love can only exist between distant natures, and man's love to God and God's love to man form the basis of the Christian fellowship.

In modern Christianity there are three ways of regarding the problem of Christ. Those whom Canon Quick calls Liberal Protestants take refuge from the metaphysical difficulty by giving attention only to the facts of the manhood of our Lord, until the man Jesus Christ becomes the sole object of their worship. (The existence of these people seems questionable but as depicted, they work into the scheme of the book in an interesting way.) Those whom Canon Quick calls Catholic Modernists concentrate attention upon the great ideas of incarnation and atonement, which, they hold, enter into and interpret all life. To these the historic personality of Jesus is negligible.

Thirdly, there are those who hold that the essential truth of orthodoxy must be retained together with the realization of Divine immanence. This position is thus stated: 'The fundamental experience of the New Testament may be roughly analysed into three ultimate certainties. (1) Human life had been exalted into a new fellowship with God in the Christian community. (2) This newness of life came through Jesus Christ, was the fruit of his death and resurrection, the token of His living Presence in the Spirit, and the preparation for His final manifestation in Glory. (3) The whole work of Jesus Christ and its results were fundamentally the work not of man but of God . . . The psychological order in which Christology was reached gives us the following sequence: (1) The new human life of fellowship comes (2) through Jesus Christ (3) from God. The logical order in which Christology is stated inverts the sequence. (1) God (2) through Jesus Christ (3) gives the new life of fellowship to men. In both orders Jesus Christ remains the middle term. He is, in that startling Johannine image, the ladder between earth and heaven, on which the angels of communication ascend and descend. Now starting from this fundamental conception of Christ as Mediator, Christian theology was simply bound in the long run to think of Him in one of two ways, either (1) as completely God and completely man, or (2) as some kind of being intermediate between God and man, *i.e.* a demi-god or a superman. In all ages the latter alternative has been found congenial to popular superstition. But orthodoxy has quite rightly pointed out that it defeats the whole purpose for which Christology was framed. For it interposes another being between man and God, and leaves where it was or thrusts down still further the common humanity which Christ has raised to fellowship with God, if Christianity be true' (pp. 95, 96-97).

Canon Quick points out that if we can find that the modern conception of God does not exclude distinction of Divine nature from human nature, we may find a synthesis between Liberal theology and what is essential orthodoxy. 'The tendency has become more and more manifest to conceive God, not as the great object of knowledge, but as Himself the great Thinker and Knower, the one Mind who knows and is active in and through ours. Instead of the one changeless eternal substance or subsistence, God becomes for our thought the universal omnipresent mental activity, by which our minds are completed and fulfilled, and under which they are subsumed . . . Whereas in ancient philosophy God is conceived primarily as a trans-objective substance, in modern philosophy God is conceived primarily as a trans-subjective activity' (p. 110).

We may think of God as universal mind in two ways. The Platonic universal was the ideal perfect reality, of which all concrete instances of any class were imperfect shadows. But the Idea or Ideal was reached by abstracting all particularities and differences which characterize particular objects. Thus the highest universal 'Being' which enters into all classes of objects becomes a negative conception, as all characteristic differences must be abstracted from it. A second conception is that of a concrete universal, that which gives meaning to the different parts of a whole. The picture gives meaning to every colour and part of the canvas. Life gives meaning to each particle of matter which it organizes. The plant gives unity to leaves and fibres. The soul gives meaning to the limbs and organs of the body. Godhead may thus be thought of as the concrete universal of human souls. But Godhead would no more be constituted by the sum of human souls than a human soul is constituted by the bodily parts or than an artist's vision in the picture is constituted by paint and canvas. God may thus be thought of as universal Being entering into every soul yet distinct in nature from humanity, as life in nature is distinct from the matter it organizes, or the soul from the body. It is, of course, in this brief summary impossible to guard against misunderstanding. The theme is worked out with great lucidity and caution by Canon Quick.

Its application to the problem of our Lord's divinity is made thus. 'In the doctrine of the New Testament love or *agape* make just the same sort of difference to human life that life itself makes to matter. That is to say *agape* gives to humanity a new property or quality which is yet more than a property or quality of itself, because it signifies its penetration and determination by something higher. Humanity full of *agape* stands to natural or psychic humanity just as organic matter stands to inorganic; it is full of a new life and a new order of being, not its own, which is determining it for a higher end. Thus naturally and inevitably *agape* stands in the New Testament (1) for the Divine nature itself above man, (2) for that which binds human souls together into unity, and (3) for a certain quality which all souls in fellowship with God must possess. In one passage we are told that God is love, in another that the body of Christ's Church builds itself up in love, and in a third that love is the one and only indispensable gift which every single Christian soul must have . . . And yet in the New Testament Godhead is never once confused with ideal manhood, the two natures are kept perfectly distinct. For love, not of course excluding the knowledge which love brings, is in all experience the principle which overcomes separation without abolishing distinction. And this has always been supremely true of the life of Christian fellowship with God and man . . . By predicating Deity of Jesus Christ we mean essentially that He is identified with that living fount and source of *agape* for which and through

which and in which the unity of man and of His world is brought about and consists. Nowhere is the Godhead of Jesus Christ more definitely declared than in the words, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them," or again, "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of the least of these My brethren ye did it unto Me." Thus we allow no separation between God's nature and man's, save for the sin and imperfection of manhood. . . . But neither do we confuse or destroy the distinction between Godhead and manhood, since Christ as God is identified with the end and author and agent of man's unity, and is therefore something infinitely more than man' (pp. 129-132).

He goes on to say that in one aspect of incarnation God is incarnate in all self-sacrificing love. 'A human spirit cannot begin to love and serve another without feeling itself somehow in harmony and in touch with a spiritual reality more and other than its own life and the life of the one it loves. All true human fellowship is in a special sense the organ of God's self-expression and activity, and in this sense we may speak of a universal incarnation of God in manhood without any implication of positivism, pantheism or mere idealistic humanism. But in another and fuller meaning of the term incarnation we see that this consciousness of God in and through human fellowship sprang in its explicit fulness from the life and death of one man, Jesus Christ . . . The underlying purpose of the whole theology which led to Chalcedon was to interpret this one personality as the great efficient cause through which the universal mystical incarnation of Godhead in manhood is continually in history being wrought and perfected' (pp. 132-133).

This is a strong and able attempt to set out the facts of Christian perplexity and set them fairly beside the fact of Christ. The writer would be the first to admit that such a conclusion as his line of thought points to is open to the criticism that can always be levelled at attempts to express the onward movement of metaphysical thought. But because it is expression that lifts life above the levels of feeling and action which man shares with beasts and birds, religion depends on vigorous expression. Religious emotion and effort to realize ideals combine to make the richest wine of life, which must always be decanted from old forms of rational and poetical expression if it is not to be wasted. In this criticism, interpretation and effort at construction Canon Quick has given to students of Christology good food for meditation and discussion. He has shown that he is certainly a force to be reckoned with in the coming theological crisis of the Anglican Communion.

In the search for rational knowledge of God, men are like a nomad tribe bivouacked on a misty plain. They hope to reach a sunlit mountain that often glimmers above the mist. Behind them lie the many roads by which they have come. These point forward in various directions, but go no further. Most of the tribe are content to busy themselves with the upkeep of these roads. Many are straining their eyes in the search for an onward road. Yet when someone attempts to stake out a way into the trackless region nearer the sunlit hills he has the whole company upon him with warnings and fears, sneers and jeers. Canon Quick has taken a step forward towards a more rational conception of the object of Christian worship. I will not join his critics: their's is an easy, if not a shallow business. Criticism and such attempts can only be useful when made by the poineers themselves. But as to the forward push that Canon Quick has made, I should like to ask some questions as to its further projection.

If we can agree with Professor Pringle Pattison that the soul, instead of being a different substance from the body, is one with it, the product

of evolution and, because the highest, the most characteristic product; and if further we believe that the best solution of the riddle of life is belief in universal creative mind immanent and transcendent, inspiring and responding to the highest values of the soul, does not the question whether this universal mind differs from human mind in kind or only in degree become meaningless? If meaningless when asked of God and His universe it is meaningless also with regard to Christ and man.

Further, is it not evident, from the book of the universe as far as we know it, that what we might call purpose or preference in creative evolution makes always, everywhere, for distinction of individuals? Is it not written on land and sea from the beginning until now that creation is making for greater and greater distinctions, until between man and man there is possible the consciousness of distinction, and friendship, and love that transcends death. Is not this surely sufficient to teach the thoughtful that the creative mind is not to be merged and blurred into sameness with creation? Do we need the dogma of the dual natures in Christ to teach us what is not only an intuition of religious experience but an inference from the facts of life?

In the light of the evident trend of creative evolution towards that distinction of persons which is the only basis and condition of love, Canon Quick's speculation as to *agape* as the concrete universal becomes not only intelligible but necessary.

LILY DOUGALL.

## THE FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONAL RELIGION.*

We have nothing but praise for this small volume. The addresses in it should be widely read, and should be of real help to many who are not ready to accept their religion at second-hand, but desire to be able to give reasons for the faith which is in them. The personal and critical notes are happily combined, and there is a simple directness of appeal about the whole group of papers which is very refreshing. The argument from experience is being much discussed to-day, and Christian apologetic, responding to the rapid growth of psychology, naturally tends to take a psychological colour. These addresses deal directly with that argument; in particular, that on 'Faith and Reason' by the Dean of St. Paul's, and that on 'The Practice of Prayer' by Dr. William Brown. The volume might be described as a reasoned attempt to justify Coleridge's advice, 'Try it,' when someone asked him to defend Christianity. Dr. Brown's paper is, perhaps, the most fresh and original of the series, and is a real contribution to a difficult subject. Its conclusion that 'the idea, current in many quarters, that modern Psychology has proved that prayer is an exploded superstition does not seem to me to rest on a truly scientific basis,' coming as it does from an expert in psychology, may well give pause to shallower thinkers. The Dean of St. Paul's has written a paper of great charm and beauty. 'The religious man has faith that the real is spiritual, and sits down like a little child to find out all that this means.' The scientific man too has faith in the rationality of the universe and acts upon that faith. 'In both cases wisdom is justified of her children.' This is the argument of the paper, and it is worked out with great clearness. A longer review would say something of the other addresses, each of which has its merits. Enough, however, has, perhaps, been said to call attention to the excellence of this small book.

VERNON STORR.

* *Religion and Life* (Addresses by Dr. Inge, Bishop N. S. Talbot, Fr. W. H. Frere, and others). Pub. B. Blackwell, price 1/- net.

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PACIFIC LIBRARY

# CORRESPONDENCE

## THE LIFE OF BISHOP HICKS.

SIR, TO THE EDITOR OF *The Modern Churchman.*

I have just read the letter of Mr. Proudfoot in the *Modern Churchman* for March with respect to my notice of Mr. Fowler's *Life of Edward Lee Hicks*. I am sorry if my concluding remarks 'jar on the ears of those who knew him well.' The purport of those remarks seems hardly to have been grasped by your correspondent. The fear I expressed was *not* lest we should lose the spirit, among our best Churchmen, of reforming zeal in ecclesiastical and social life, but merely that the narrowing of scope for broad and especially for classical culture in the education of our clergy might prove unfavourable to the formation of the best product of our Church, the all-round historical clergyman excellently represented by Bishop Hicks.

ALICE GARDNER.

---

SIR,

I am glad that Miss Gardner's review of my book should have given Mr. Proudfoot the opportunity of adding his testimony to 'Hicks the Crusader,' and of supplementing the *Life* by several sayings that deserve to be remembered. These additions are consistent with the impression of the Bishop's character which I had sought to convey, and with the general impression conveyed by Miss Gardner's article.

Unfortunately with these welcome additions Mr. Proudfoot has combined two charges against the biographer, (1) of having made 'far too sparing a use of the letters,' (2) of having 'toned down far too much the controversial aspects' of Hicks's career.

To both charges I plead not guilty. Conditions of publication (it was Mrs. Hick's earnest desire that the price should be moderate) made it essential to keep the book within the limits that were actually observed. Nothing else, therefore, could have been inserted except at the cost of excluding something which has been admitted. As it is, I have made use of every *important* sentence in every letter of the Bishop's which passed through my hands. Mr. Proudfoot's mention of 700 letters which he personally received may easily convey a misleading impression. He himself made for me a selection of about thirty of these letters. But very few of them were 'letters' in the sense which that word should bear for a biographer or his readers. They all belonged to the periods covered by the chapters of Canon Green and Canon Boulter. I copied out for them everything that could conceivably be of use, and there is no doubt that they used this material, though only one letter was actually quoted. It is a fair inference that they were even less impressed than I was with the importance of printing these letters. To suppose that any of them could compare in importance with the letters printed in the book would be a complete mistake. Though Hicks could write an admirable letter, as the *Life* shows, letters were not the medium through which he most naturally or habitually expressed himself. He was not a letter-writer in the same sense as his contemporary Creighton. As a rule, he was more brilliant and stimulating in conversation than in letters.

Next, as to 'toning down the controversial aspects,' may I recall the words which Hicks chose for the memorial to his eldest son, 'He fought for peace and found it'? In that spirit I have refrained from raking the ashes of controversy, but I have never wilfully understated any of Hicks's convictions. Oddly enough, almost the only passage which I 'toned down' editorially was so treated in Mr. Proudfoot's own interest. He

had warned me that he alone could tell 'the truth' about Miss Picton-Turberville preaching in his church. There was clearly a conflict of evidence, and the Bishop was not alive to settle the point. But as the incident occurred during the Bishop's last illness, Mr. Proudfoot rather than Hicks would seem to have been the Crusader.

That Hicks throughout his career aimed at maintaining (in the words of your motto): 'the cause of Truth, Freedom, and Comprehensiveness in the Anglican Communion' will, I trust, be abundantly clear to every reader of my book. A biographer who is a member of the Churchmen's Union was under no temptation to 'tone down' this aspect of the life he had set himself to portray.

But the best answer to Mr. Proudfoot is, after all, the reception accorded to the *Life* by the Bishop's other friends and by the press and the public.

J. H. Fowler.

Sir,

## PSYCHOLOGY, ANCIENT AND MODERN.

The word psychology means presumably the science of the soul, and in practice it stands for the study of states of consciousness. The psychologist observes and notes and measures the states of mind of himself and others, and tries to discover the laws which regulate them, and to account for their appearance, their fluctuations and their passing away. But the people who first wrote systematically about the soul, the Greek philosophers, were pursuing a somewhat different aim, and employed entirely different methods. They were not much interested in the mental behaviour of individuals. Soul to them was rather a general term, like matter or mass or energy, and their object was to ascertain the place of soul in the universe, its rank in the scale of being. They seem to us to have been too ambitious, to have striven after a kind of knowledge which was really unattainable, and their whole procedure was certainly unscientific, if science means the patient collection of data and the careful testing of all generalizations.

This can be seen very clearly in relation to the problem of immortality. In the twentieth century this, like every other problem, is held to be mainly, if not altogether, a question of evidence, with the practical result that all phenomena which seem to have any bearing on the case are carefully examined, and the testimony of the witnesses scrupulously checked and weighed. The Greek thinkers, on the other hand, seem never to have paid the slightest attention to ghost-stories or preternatural happenings of any kind. Plato, who was passionately interested in the subject and has left many elaborate 'proofs' that the soul is immortal, relies wholly on arguments drawn from the nature of the soul in its own right. Even the ordinary Greek citizen, who certainly shared the normal human curiosity as to what happens to us after death, seems not to have taken any account of what we should call evidential facts. If he believed in a future life at all, he did so either, like Plato, on *a priori* grounds, or because he was emotionally moved thereto by the myth and ritual of his religious mysteries. When we come to the later schools of philosophy which flourished in the Roman world, in a period when medicine and even biology were scientifically pursued on the grand lines laid down by Aristotle, even then psychology remained a field for purely abstract theorizing, except in so far as the doctors, in the course of their practice, were led to throw out tentative suggestions on the connexion of soul and body. Stoics and Epicureans, Cynics and Neoplatonists preached annihilation or immortality in accordance with their fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality, never with any reference to observed facts which might be considered to point one way or another.

And so, to return to our main topic, did they treat all questions relating to psychology. It is almost as though they had heard and accepted Kant's dictum that the nature of the ego is not 'phenomenal,' but 'transcendental'; that the soul or self cannot be an object of direct study to the scientific understanding, like other objects in the physical universe. It is our self which experiences everything, which knows and feels and desires, and which therefore cannot itself be experienced. How far this attitude is justified: whether the *Phaedo* or *Raymond* represents the proper method of establishing our claim to immortality; whether the Neoplatonists or the Psycho-analysts have more to tell us which is of permanent value about the nature of the soul—these are questions which cannot be hastily decided. 'The truth is great and shall prevail,' whether we like it or not. If the ancient opinion of the soul as the one principle of reality, whose reality cannot be proved or even examined without self-contradiction, because it is tacitly and necessarily assumed in all proof of anything whatever—if this opinion is but a dream, however beautiful, it will assuredly be dissipated like other dreams at the cold touch of truth; and the world will be better for another delusion gone. But in the meantime the issue is still *sub judice,* and, if we must speak our mind, is likely to remain so, as long as men remain conscious, however spasmodically, of those

> 'High instincts before which our mortal nature
> Doth tremble like a guilty thing surprised.'

At any rate, while a doubt is left, let us turn occasionally from the modern men, who analyse our dreams and time our reactions, to those older psychologists who held, with the Athenian stranger in the *Laws,* 'that the soul is the eldest of all things which are born, and is immortal, and rules over all bodies.' The new psychologists ought to find it easy to forgive, and even to thank us; for our obsession by the old will at least provide them with a new complex to disentangle.

PHILIP S. RICHARDS.

SIR,

## CHRISTIAN SCIENCE.

Mr. Tennant's methods of reasoning make it almost impossible to reply to him except by a series of *ex cathedra* assertions like his own. The doctrine of 'mortal mind' is, I affirm, a superstition which should lead to scepticism in theory, and which does lead to disastrous results when put into practice.

A correct major premiss does not guarantee a correct conclusion—two correct premisses are required and the minor premiss of Christian Science is false. And therefore, in order to accept Christian Science idealism as true, it is not sufficient to be spiritually awake, one must be also intellectually asleep. Reason must have abjured its functions.

'Suggestion' is, I submit, the general name applied outside Christian Science circles, to the agency operative in all varieties of mental healing, whether practised by hypnotists, mesmerists, psycho-analysts or Christian Scientists—and though each firm may claim that its own speciality is unique, an impartial chemist will find the same ingredient in each specific with different colouring matter and under an exclusive label. When Mr. Tennant says that I do not 'understand' the principle on which Chrisian Science is based, he only means that I do not accept it—it is possible to understand an opinion and yet to reject it.

Of Mrs. Eddy's education—its range and profundity—of the accuracy of her thought—the terseness and felicity of her style—of the delicacy and humility of her spirit—of the brilliance of her attainments in natural philosophy, logic, and moral science, in Hebrew, Greek and Latin, her book *Science and Health* is a sufficient monument.

CHARLES P. PRICE.